## Facts

- Anthony Nicini, Jr., a minor, entered state child-welfare involvement after allegations of abuse at home and repeated mental-health crises, including suicide attempts and running away.
- New Jersey’s child-welfare agency removed Nicini from his parents and placed him in foster care; he repeatedly left placements.
- After another crisis and hospitalization, Nicini went to live with family friends (the Morras).
- DYFS caseworker Frank Cyrus approved an informal, temporary “para-foster” placement with the Morras even though they were not a licensed foster home.
- Before the placement, Cyrus visited the home, interviewed the Morras, and performed agency background procedures, including a child-abuse registry check; a family-court judge ordered Nicini to remain in the Morra home.
- Nicini later left the Morra home and alleged that the Morras supplied him drugs and that Edward Morra sexually abused him.
- Morra had a prior criminal history involving “corrupting minors,” which did not surface through the checks performed before placement.
- During the placement, Nicini did not report abuse or drug activity to Cyrus; parental concerns were raised but not as specific allegations of sexual abuse or a concrete, known danger.

## Issues

1. Whether a child placed by the state in foster care or a foster-like setting has a substantive due process right to protection based on a “special relationship” with the state.
2. Whether the caseworker’s investigation and approval of the placement constituted conscience-shocking conduct—at least deliberate indifference to a known or obvious substantial risk—supporting liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
3. Whether qualified immunity would bar recovery if a constitutional violation were shown.

## Decision

- The court held that when the state places a child in foster care, a “special relationship” arises that can impose an affirmative duty on the state to protect the child’s safety and well-being while in custody.
- The court applied the substantive due process “shocks the conscience” standard; negligence is insufficient, and liability requires at least deliberate indifference to a known or obvious substantial risk of serious harm.
- Viewing the record in Nicini’s favor, the court found no evidence that Cyrus knowingly disregarded a substantial risk to Nicini in the Morra home.
- The court affirmed summary judgment for Cyrus on the § 1983 claim; having found no constitutional violation, it did not need to resolve qualified immunity as an alternative ground.

## Legal Principles

- State custody over a child placed in foster care creates a “special relationship” that can trigger an affirmative substantive due process duty to provide reasonable safety.
- Substantive due process liability for failure to protect requires conduct so egregious that it “shocks the conscience.”
- In the foster-care placement context, conscience-shocking conduct generally requires at least deliberate indifference to a known or obvious, substantial risk of harm; negligence and ordinary investigative shortcomings do not establish a constitutional violation.
- A state actor’s failure to discover concealed danger, without proof of knowing disregard of a substantial risk, does not satisfy the due process culpability threshold for § 1983.

## Conclusion

The court recognized an affirmative duty of protection arising from the state’s foster-care custody but held that the caseworker’s placement investigation and supervision, at most negligent on this record, did not amount to deliberate indifference or other conscience-shocking conduct required for § 1983 liability.


Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc)