Introduction
The doctrine of necessity in property law allows a limited exception to the rule that a person cannot interfere with another's land without permission. Nickerson v Barraclough [1981] Ch 426 examines this doctrine, showing the careful method courts use when reviewing claims of necessity. The case stresses that absolute need, not ease or personal benefit, must be proven for the defense to succeed. Key conditions, such as immediate danger and no alternatives, shape this principle. This decision explains how the necessity defense works and its boundaries.
The Facts of Nickerson v Barraclough
The disagreement centered on access to a property without a direct road connection. The plaintiff, Mrs. Nickerson, owned land reachable only through a right of way over the defendant’s (Mr. Barraclough’s) land. This access was blocked. Mrs. Nickerson claimed she had a right of way by necessity, arguing her property could not otherwise be used.
The Court’s Strict View of Necessity
The Court of Appeal dismissed Mrs. Nickerson’s claim. Lord Justice Brightman’s judgment outlined the strict standards for proving a right of way by necessity. He stated necessity must be absolute, with no other practical options. The convenience of using the defendant’s land was not enough. The court concluded Mrs. Nickerson could reach her property through other methods, even if less direct, so absolute necessity was not proven.
How Necessity Differs from Other Legal Ideas
The Nickerson ruling separates necessity from ideas like implied grants. Implied grants depend on the parties’ assumed intentions when land was first divided. Necessity, however, applies regardless of intent, acting as an exception to trespass laws. This difference shows how strictly necessity is used. Wong v Beaumont Property Trust Ltd [1965] 1 QB 173 offers a contrasting example where necessity worked, demonstrating the specific facts needed.
Rejection of the Implied Grant Claim
Mrs. Nickerson also pursued a right of way through an implied grant. She argued that when the land was split, a right of way should have been added for the landlocked section. The Court rejected this. Referring to cases like Wheeldon v Burrows (1879) 12 Ch D 31, the court noted implied grants require proof of shared prior ownership and existing access before division. This was absent in Nickerson, restricting claims to access over another’s land.
Impact and Later Cases
Nickerson v Barraclough remains relevant in property law. It confirms necessity applies only in rare situations. Later rulings, such as Manjang v Drammeh (1990) 61 P & CR 194, follow this strict method, reflecting Nickerson’s role in shaping necessity. The decision makes clear that lacking direct access alone does not create a right of way by necessity.
Conclusion
Nickerson v Barraclough defines the doctrine of necessity in property law. It demands proof of unavoidable need, not just convenience. The case confirms that interfering with another’s land requires clear legal grounds, reserving necessity for rare instances. By separating necessity from implied grants, the ruling clarifies access rights. This judgment stays significant in property disputes, as seen in cases like Manjang v Drammeh, where courts uphold strict criteria for necessity claims.
