## Facts

- Raymond Vincent Nidds, a 54-year-old elevator service mechanic, was hired by Schindler Elevator Corporation in 1988 and assigned to a downtown San Francisco service route.
- A supervisor allegedly stated he wanted to get rid of “old timers.”
- In October 1990, Schindler laid off Nidds and two other mechanics, citing reduced business; Nidds received a favorable recommendation and was told he would be considered for rehire if business improved.
- Nidds’s former route was assigned substantially to a 25-year-old mechanic shortly after the layoff.
- Nidds filed an age-discrimination complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) in December 1990.
- Schindler rehired Nidds in August 1991 and assigned him to a swing shift and then a “special service route” handling scattered customers and special projects; his hours and pay were not shown to be reduced at that time.
- In early 1992, a customer complained about Nidds’s service; a building manager sent a critical letter about his work and attitude, and Schindler removed Nidds from that account.
- In September 1992, Schindler terminated Nidds, citing business conditions and performance problems.
- Nidds filed additional DFEH complaints and sued under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) for age discrimination (1990 layoff and 1992 discharge) and retaliation (post-complaint treatment and termination).
- The district court granted summary judgment to Schindler on all claims and denied Nidds’s request to continue discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f).

## Issues

1. Whether Nidds presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue that Schindler’s stated reasons for the 1990 layoff and 1992 termination were a pretext for age discrimination under FEHA.
2. Whether Nidds presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue that Schindler terminated or treated him adversely in retaliation for filing DFEH complaints.
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying a Rule 56(f) request to continue discovery before ruling on summary judgment.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Schindler on the FEHA age-discrimination and retaliation claims.
- The court assumed Nidds could establish a prima facie case but held Schindler articulated legitimate reasons: reduced business for the layoff and performance/customer-complaint concerns (with business conditions) for the termination.
- The alleged “old timers” statement was treated as a stray remark not sufficiently connected to the challenged decisions to create a genuine factual dispute.
- Evidence that a younger mechanic took over much of Nidds’s route and that older workers were affected by layoffs did not, on this record, show intentional discrimination or pretext.
- Schindler’s rehiring of Nidds and the absence of proof that the post-rehire assignment was materially worse weighed against an inference of age-based animus.
- On retaliation, the time between the initial DFEH filing and the termination was too remote, without additional non-speculative evidence, to support causation; Nidds did not produce adequate evidence that the customer letter or performance rationale was fabricated.
- The court held there was no abuse of discretion in denying a discovery continuance because Nidds did not identify specific facts he expected to obtain, explain how they would defeat summary judgment, or show why they were previously unavailable.

## Legal Principles

- FEHA discrimination and retaliation claims at summary judgment may be analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework: prima facie case, employer’s legitimate reason, then proof of pretext.
- At the pretext stage, the plaintiff must produce evidence sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to conclude the employer’s stated reasons are untrue or a cover for unlawful motive; speculation and minor asserted inconsistencies are insufficient.
- Stray age-related remarks, without a close connection in time or context to the adverse action or decisionmaking process, generally do not create a triable issue of discriminatory intent.
- Temporal proximity can support retaliation causation only when sufficiently close; a substantial gap weakens any inference absent other concrete evidence.
- A Rule 56(f) (now 56(d)) continuance requires a specific showing of what discoverable facts are sought, how they would preclude summary judgment, and why they could not have been obtained earlier; failure to make that showing supports denial.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit upheld summary judgment because Nidds did not produce evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that Schindler’s economic and performance explanations were pretext for age discrimination or retaliation under FEHA, and he did not meet the required showing for additional discovery before the summary-judgment ruling.


Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 103 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 1996)