## Facts

- Harry Niederman walked with his son at 15th and Market Streets in Philadelphia.
- Gerald Brodsky allegedly drove negligently, skidded onto the sidewalk, and struck objects and Niederman’s son.
- Brodsky’s vehicle did not strike Niederman.
- Niederman alleged that immediately after the incident he suffered severe chest pain and was hospitalized for five weeks.
- He claimed diagnoses including acute coronary insufficiency, coronary failure, angina pectoris, and possible myocardial infarction.
- He sought damages for physical cardiac injuries and associated shock and mental pain allegedly caused by fright from the near-collision.

## Issues

1. Whether a plaintiff may recover for serious physical injury caused by negligent fright or shock when there was no contemporaneous physical impact.
2. Whether recovery should be limited to plaintiffs within the “zone of danger” who reasonably feared imminent physical impact.

## Decision

- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the dismissal entered on preliminary objections.
- The court abandoned the strict “impact rule” as a categorical bar to recovery.
- The court held a plaintiff may proceed without physical impact if the plaintiff was in personal danger of physical impact, actually feared that impact, and suffered physical injury as a result.
- The case was remanded to permit Niederman to attempt to prove negligence, causation, and damages at trial.

## Legal Principles

- Physical impact is not a required element for recovery when negligent conduct places a plaintiff in immediate risk of bodily harm and fright causes physical injury.
- A limiting condition applies: the plaintiff must be within the zone of danger (personal danger of physical impact) and must have feared such impact.
- Concerns about false or trivial claims are addressed through ordinary proof requirements and fact-finding, not by a categorical no-impact bar.
- Negligence liability extends to natural and proximate consequences of misconduct, including medically demonstrable physical injury precipitated by emotional shock.

## Conclusion

Pennsylvania recognized a zone-of-danger theory for negligent infliction of emotional distress, permitting recovery for physical injuries caused by fright even without impact, and allowed the plaintiff to proceed to trial on his allegations.


Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (Pa. 1970)