## Facts

- In 1980, Nike, Inc. (Nike) began selling cleated sports shoes and entered endorsement contracts with professional athletes requiring or expecting the athletes to appear in Nike footwear bearing Nike’s distinctive “swoosh-stripe” mark.
- Brooks Shoe Manufacturing Co., Inc. (Brooks) also sold athletic shoes and entered endorsement contracts with professional athletes.
- During the 1980 Super Bowl and the 1980 baseball season, several athletes modified (“doctored”) Brooks shoes so that the athletes could wear Brooks shoes while the shoes displayed Nike’s swoosh.
- In the federal action reported at 509 F. Supp. 919, Brooks asserted a counterclaim against Nike and sought injunctive relief aimed at stopping Nike from permitting or allowing the swoosh to be placed on shoes made by Brooks (or other manufacturers) and then worn by athletes in competition.
- Brooks alleged that Nike’s conduct amounted to false designation of origin and false description under the Lanham Act because the Nike mark was displayed on non-Nike shoes in a way that suggested Nike-origin or Nike-authenticated footwear.
- Brooks also pleaded antitrust theories under the Sherman Act and Clayton Act, contending Nike’s endorsement-and-marking conduct was part of an effort to monopolize the running-shoe market.

## Issues

1. Whether Brooks was entitled to injunctive relief based on a Lanham Act theory that Nike’s swoosh displayed on non-Nike shoes constituted a false designation of origin or false description likely to mislead consumers.
2. Whether Brooks’s antitrust allegations (including attempted monopolization) supported injunctive relief based on Nike’s alleged use of endorsements and trademark display to harm competition.
3. Whether the requested injunction could properly run against Nike where the physical “doctoring” was performed by athletes, and Nike’s responsibility turned on authorization, control, or knowing acquiescence.

## Decision

- The court addressed Brooks’s request for injunction focused on Nike’s alleged authorization or allowance of Nike trademark display on competitors’ shoes in televised and public athletic events.
- The court treated the Lanham Act question as turning on whether the challenged conduct was likely to mislead the public as to the origin, sponsorship, or nature of the footwear being displayed under Nike’s mark.
- The court did not award injunctive relief on Brooks’s antitrust theories on the showing made at that stage, concluding that the antitrust allegations did not justify preliminary relief independent of the trademark-based dispute.

## Legal Principles

- Lanham Act false designation/false description claims may be based on use of a mark in a manner likely to cause confusion or mistake about the origin or sponsorship of goods, including where branding is placed on goods made by another source.
- Requests for preliminary injunctive relief require a showing that justifies court intervention before final adjudication, including a sufficient demonstration of likely success on the merits and harm that cannot be adequately repaired by later monetary relief.
- Antitrust claims seeking injunctive relief must be supported by facts showing more than aggressive branding or endorsement practices; attempted monopolization requires proof-oriented elements such as exclusionary conduct, specific intent, and a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power in a properly defined market.
- Where third parties physically carry out the challenged acts (here, altering shoes), liability and injunctive scope depend on whether the defendant authorized, directed, controlled, or knowingly permitted the conduct.

## Conclusion

Nike, Inc. v. Rubber Manufacturers Association, Inc. arose from Brooks’s counterclaim seeking to stop Nike from allowing athletes to display Nike’s swoosh on non-Nike shoes, which Brooks argued falsely represented the shoes’ origin or sponsorship and also supported antitrust claims; the court analyzed the request for injunctive relief through the Lanham Act confusion framework and declined to grant preliminary relief on the antitrust theories on the record presented.


Nike, Inc. v. Rubber Manufacturers Association, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 919 (1981)