## Facts

- Nishimura Ekiu, a 25-year-old Japanese national, arrived at the port of San Francisco from Yokohama on May 7, 1891.
- Federal immigration officials inspected her under federal immigration statutes and concluded she was “likely to become a public charge,” making her excludable.
- An immigration official prepared a written report noting inconsistencies about her claimed travel with a husband and stating she had \$22 and planned to stay at a hotel until contacted.
- Pending the entry decision, she was held in custody of immigration authorities and housed at a mission rather than permitted to land freely.
- She sought admission and contested the exclusion determination.

## Issues

1. Whether Congress could constitutionally authorize executive immigration officials to exclude arriving aliens, including those deemed “likely to become a public charge,” under the Immigration Act of 1891.
2. Whether an immigration inspector’s exclusion decision, made under the 1891 Act, was final on the merits and therefore not subject to judicial reexamination on habeas corpus.
3. Whether the Due Process Clause required a judicial hearing on admissibility for an arriving alien denied initial entry, beyond the administrative procedures provided by Congress.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of habeas relief.
- The Court upheld the Immigration Act of 1891 as a valid exercise of federal power over admission of aliens.
- The Court held that, when made within statutory authority, an immigration inspector’s determination that an alien falls within an excluded class is “final and conclusive,” subject only to the administrative appeal path to superior executive officers.
- The Court ruled that habeas corpus may test statutory authority and jurisdiction, but cannot be used to retry the factual basis of an exclusion decision Congress has made final in the executive branch.
- The Court concluded that, for an arriving alien seeking initial admission, the procedures Congress provides and assigns to executive officers satisfy due process when those officers act within conferred power.
- Justice Brewer dissented.

## Legal Principles

- Congress may regulate the admission of aliens and assign front-line admissibility factfinding to executive officers.
- For initial entry determinations, due process is satisfied by the administrative procedures Congress prescribes and the decisions of authorized executive officers acting within delegated power.
- When Congress makes an immigration exclusion determination final in the executive branch, federal courts on habeas corpus may review only whether detention rests on a valid statute and whether the officer acted within jurisdiction, not the factual merits of admissibility.
- If lawful grounds for detention are shown on habeas corpus, release is not required merely because of alleged defects in the original arrest or commitment.

## Conclusion

The Court sustained the constitutionality of the 1891 immigration framework and treated the executive exclusion of an arriving alien as conclusive on the facts, limiting habeas corpus to jurisdictional and statutory-validity review rather than a judicial rehearing on admissibility.


Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892)