## Facts

- Missouri enacted Mo. Rev. Stat. § 392.410(7), barring the State’s political subdivisions from offering telecommunications services for which a certificate of authority is required.
- The Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides in 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) that no state or local legal requirement may prohibit or effectively prohibit the ability of “any entity” to provide telecommunications services, and § 253(d) authorizes FCC preemption of violating requirements.
- Missouri municipalities and municipally owned utilities petitioned the FCC to preempt the Missouri ban under § 253(a).
- The FCC declined to preempt, concluding that “any entity” in § 253(a) does not include a State’s political subdivisions.
- The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that “any entity” (especially with “any”) clearly includes governmental entities and preempts the Missouri statute.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether § 253(a) reaches a State’s restriction on its own subdivisions’ entry into telecommunications markets.

## Issues

1. Whether “any entity” in 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) includes a State’s political subdivisions, such that federal law preempts a state statute barring municipalities from providing telecommunications services.
2. Whether, under federalism clear-statement principles, Congress must speak unmistakably clearly before federal law is read to limit a State’s control over the powers of its municipalities.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit (8–1).
- Section 253(a)’s reference to “any entity” does not include a State’s own political subdivisions.
- Because Congress did not clearly state an intent to displace state authority over municipal powers, § 253(a) does not preempt Missouri’s ban on municipal telecommunications service.
- Concurrence: Justices Scalia and Thomas agreed in the judgment, emphasizing statutory context and the State–subdivision relationship rather than reliance on a clear-statement canon.
- Dissent: Justice Stevens would have held that “any entity” includes municipalities and that the Missouri statute is preempted.

## Legal Principles

- Federal preemption claims affecting a State’s organization and control of its political subdivisions require an unmistakably clear statement of congressional intent before courts will read federal law to intrude on that state authority.
- In § 253(a), the phrase “any entity,” read in statutory context, does not clearly cover municipal subdivisions against their parent State’s decision to withhold authority to provide telecommunications services.
- General federal pro-competition policy in telecommunications cannot substitute for clear statutory language when the asserted preemption would alter the usual federal–state balance regarding state control of municipalities.

## Conclusion

The Court held that § 253(a) of the Telecommunications Act does not preempt Missouri’s prohibition on municipal provision of telecommunications services because “any entity” does not unmistakably include a State’s political subdivisions, leaving States free to restrict municipalities’ market entry absent clear contrary federal direction.


Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004)