## Facts

- Austin Co. served as general contractor for construction of a home for the aged and subcontracted HVAC work to Hudik‑Ross Co.
- Project specifications required Austin to purchase prefabricated climate-control units manufactured by Slant/Fin Corp.
- The Slant/Fin units arrived with internal piping already cut, threaded, and installed at the factory.
- Hudik’s collective-bargaining agreement with the union contained a work-preservation clause requiring pipe threading and cutting to be performed on the jobsite by union steamfitters.
- At the union’s instigation, Hudik’s union steamfitters refused to install the units because the factory-installed internal piping allegedly violated the agreement.
- Austin filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging the union violated NLRA § 8(b)(4)(B) by inducing a refusal to work with an object of forcing Hudik to cease doing business with Austin and/or to stop using Slant/Fin units.
- An ALJ and the NLRB found a § 8(b)(4)(B) violation and issued a cease-and-desist order; the D.C. Circuit set the order aside as primary activity.

## Issues

1. Whether the union’s induced refusal to install the prefabricated units was protected primary activity aimed at preserving bargaining-unit work.
2. Whether “an object” of the union’s conduct was to force Hudik and/or Austin to cease doing business with another person (including Slant/Fin), making the conduct prohibited secondary activity under NLRA § 8(b)(4)(B).
3. Whether the NLRB’s characterization of the union’s objective and the primary/secondary distinction was supported by substantial evidence warranting judicial deference.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit and enforced the NLRB’s cease-and-desist order.
- The Court held the union’s conduct violated § 8(b)(4)(B) because it had a prohibited secondary object.
- The Court accepted the NLRB’s findings that Hudik lacked the power to grant the union’s demand because the relevant product and design decisions were controlled by Austin and embodied in the project specifications.
- The Court concluded that, even if the union also sought to enforce a work-preservation clause, “an object” of the pressure was to affect the business relationships and purchasing decisions of other entities, bringing the conduct within § 8(b)(4)(B).

## Legal Principles

- NLRA § 8(b)(4)(B) prohibits union inducement or coercion where “an object” is to force any person to cease doing business with any other person; the presence of any such object suffices even if other objectives are lawful.
- A valid work-preservation clause does not automatically immunize union pressure; legality turns on the objective of the conduct and whether the pressured employer has the power to assign the disputed work.
- Pressure directed at an employer who cannot grant the demanded work, when used to influence upstream contracting or product-selection decisions of other firms, may be treated as prohibited secondary activity.
- The NLRB’s determination of union objectives and the primary/secondary characterization is entitled to judicial deference when supported by substantial evidence.

## Conclusion

The Court held that the union’s refusal to install prefabricated units, though tied to a work-preservation clause, constituted unlawful secondary pressure under § 8(b)(4)(B) because Hudik could not award the disputed work and the conduct aimed to force changes in other firms’ business dealings and purchasing decisions.


NLRB v. Enter. Ass’n of Steam, Hot Water, Hydraulic Sprinkler, Pneumatic Tube, Ice Mach. & Gen. Pipefitters of N.Y. & Vicinity, Local Union No. 638, 429 U.S. 507 (1977)