## Facts

- General Electric (GE) and the International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers (IUE) engaged in national collective bargaining negotiations in 1960.
- GE used a structured bargaining approach featuring intensive preparation, presentation of a comprehensive “firm and fair” offer, and a public communications campaign directed to employees and the public.
- The negotiations led to a national strike lasting about three weeks, after which the union accepted a contract substantially reflecting GE’s terms.
- The union filed unfair labor practice charges; the NLRB issued a complaint alleging violations of NLRA §§ 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), and 8(a)(5).
- After extensive hearings, the NLRB found GE committed unfair labor practices and ordered remedies, including findings tied to:
  - an overall refusal to bargain in good faith based on GE’s bargaining strategy;
  - refusal to provide requested cost and related bargaining information;
  - attempts to deal with local union officials on matters reserved to national bargaining; and
  - presentation of a personal accident insurance plan on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis.
- GE petitioned to set aside the Board’s order; the NLRB cross-petitioned for enforcement.

## Issues

1. Whether an employer may be found to have bargained in bad faith under NLRA § 8(a)(5) even if the parties ultimately execute a collective bargaining agreement largely on the employer’s terms.
2. Whether substantial evidence supported the NLRB’s findings that GE violated § 8(a)(5) (and derivatively § 8(a)(1)) by:
   1. refusing to furnish requested bargaining information,
   2. attempting to bargain with or through local union officials instead of the national representative, and
   3. insisting on a personal accident insurance plan in a manner inconsistent with meaningful bargaining.

## Decision

- The court denied enforcement of the NLRB’s broad finding that GE’s overall bargaining strategy, standing alone, established bad-faith bargaining under § 8(a)(5).
- The court held that the existence of an agreement does not foreclose a bad-faith finding, but it required concrete proof of refusal to bargain rather than condemnation of a bargaining “philosophy.”
- The court enforced the Board’s order in part as to specific conduct supported by substantial evidence, including certain refusals to provide relevant bargaining information and certain efforts to deal separately with locals.
- The court denied enforcement in part where the Board’s conclusions were insufficiently tied to specific, demonstrable bargaining misconduct (including overbroad reliance on the “take-it-or-leave-it” characterization absent proof of bypass or refusal to negotiate).
- Judge Friendly dissented in part.

## Legal Principles

- Good-faith bargaining under NLRA § 8(a)(5) is assessed from the totality of an employer’s conduct; reaching an agreement is relevant but not dispositive.
- Hard bargaining and maintaining a firm position are not per se unlawful; illegality turns on whether the employer’s conduct shows an actual refusal to negotiate, consider proposals, or treat the union as exclusive representative.
- An employer must furnish information that is relevant and reasonably necessary to the union’s performance of its bargaining duties; refusal can independently violate § 8(a)(5) (and § 8(a)(1)).
- An employer may not undermine the designated bargaining representative by negotiating around it, including by dealing separately with local officials on matters committed to national bargaining.
- Employer communications to employees are not automatically unlawful, but may be probative if used to bypass bargaining or weaken the union’s representative role.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit limited the NLRB’s ability to infer bad-faith bargaining from GE’s overarching negotiation strategy alone, while enforcing the Board’s order only to the extent specific, evidenced conduct showed concrete failures to bargain—such as withholding relevant information or attempting to fragment bargaining by dealing with locals.


NLRB v. Gen. Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969)