## Facts

- A fire erupted on October 11, 1988, while vessels were berthed at a marina operated by Bradford Marine, Inc.
- The fire originated on the M/V Prime Time, owned by Prime Time Charters, Inc., and spread debris that destroyed vessels owned by Lyn C. Noble and Robert C. Muir.
- Noble (June 7, 1989) and Muir (July 15, 1989) filed separate tort actions in Florida state court, initially naming Bradford as defendant.
- Both plaintiffs later amended to add Prime Time (and Muir also added an insurer).
- Prime Time removed each action to federal court invoking admiralty jurisdiction; the Noble case had previously been remanded for failure of all defendants to join the removal.
- The district court, acting sua sponte, examined whether removal jurisdiction was properly and timely invoked.

## Issues

1. Whether removal was procedurally proper where the actions were removable on admiralty grounds from the time the original complaints were served on the original defendant.
2. Whether Prime Time’s removal was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) because more than 30 days had elapsed since service of the initial pleadings on Bradford.
3. Whether adding Prime Time as a new defendant restarted the 30-day removal period absent any new basis for federal jurisdiction.

## Decision

- The court remanded both actions to state court.
- The court held removal was untimely under § 1446(b) because the cases were removable from the outset and the original defendant did not remove within 30 days.
- The court rejected the argument that service on a later-added defendant restarts the removal clock where the amendment does not introduce a new jurisdictional basis.
- The court held that noncompliance with the statutory timing requirements rendered removal improvident.

## Legal Principles

- Federal courts may examine subject-matter jurisdiction and removal defects sua sponte.
- Removal statutes are strictly construed; doubts are resolved in favor of remand.
- The § 1446(b) 30-day removal period is mandatory; failure to comply is a procedural defect supporting remand.
- If the initial pleading is removable when served, later events (including adding a defendant) do not restart the removal period unless the amendment supplies a new and different basis for federal jurisdiction.
- An original defendant’s failure to remove within the statutory period can preclude later removal on the same jurisdictional basis by a subsequently added defendant.

## Conclusion

Because admiralty jurisdiction existed from the beginning and the original defendant did not remove within § 1446(b)’s 30-day window, the later-added defendant could not revive removal without a new jurisdictional basis; the actions were therefore remanded to state court.


Noble v. Bradford Marine, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 395 (S.D. Fla. 1992)