## Facts

- Paula Eastwood filed a workers’ compensation claim for three separate injuries against three insurers.
- At conciliation, the DIA conciliator directed Eastwood to add a fourth insurer to the claim. Eastwood disputed that the additional insurer was required.
- The conciliator withdrew Eastwood’s claim. On internal review, the DIA senior judge affirmed, stating Eastwood had not added the fourth insurer and had not provided documents the conciliator requested.
- Valerie Sullivan filed a claim against one insurer. After the insurer paid benefits late, Sullivan sought a statutory late-payment penalty.
- The conciliator extended the conciliation period as allowed by statute, but no further conciliation session occurred and no record of a session was placed in the file.
- The conciliator withdrew Sullivan’s claim, and the senior judge affirmed.
- Emile Tabea filed a claim after a back injury and missed work. He did not obtain medical treatment for each day he was absent.
- The conciliator demanded medical treatment records for each missed day; Tabea could not supply that documentation.
- The conciliator withdrew Tabea’s claim, and the senior judge affirmed.
- Alvarez Hinton filed a claim for total-disability benefits and submitted physician documents that did not state he was totally disabled.
- The conciliator withdrew Hinton’s claim for insufficient documentation; Hinton did not allege what action the senior judge took after his appeal from the withdrawal.
- Eastwood, Sullivan, Tabea, and Hinton sued the DIA Commissioner and the DIA senior judge in Massachusetts Superior Court seeking declaratory relief, relief in the nature of mandamus, and relief for alleged procedural due process violations.
- The Commissioner and senior judge moved to dismiss, arguing (among other grounds) that the court lacked jurisdiction, plaintiffs had adequate administrative routes, and the complaint failed to state claims.

## Issues

1. Whether the Superior Court could hear a declaratory judgment and mandamus action challenging the DIA’s use of “withdrawal” at conciliation, notwithstanding the workers’ compensation administrative framework in G.L. c. 152.
2. Whether, taking the complaint’s allegations as true, G.L. c. 152 and DIA regulations authorize conciliators (and the senior judge on review) to withdraw claims at conciliation for asserted failures such as not joining an insurer or not producing specified documentation.
3. Whether allegations that withdrawals occurred without meaningful process (including an adequate record or opportunity to be heard) stated a claim for procedural due process violations.
4. Whether the complaint adequately pleaded predicates for relief in the nature of mandamus and declaratory judgment at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

## Decision

- The court denied the motion to dismiss in material part, allowing the action to proceed past the pleadings stage.
- The court concluded the complaint alleged a justiciable controversy over the legality of the DIA’s conciliation-stage withdrawal practice and did not require dismissal merely because the dispute arose in a workers’ compensation setting.
- The court held the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that withdrawing claims at conciliation, based on the asserted deficiencies described, exceeded the authority conferred by the workers’ compensation statute and related procedures.
- The court declined to dismiss the due process claims at the pleading stage, accepting as plausible the allegation that the withdrawals cut off access to the statutory claim process without sufficient procedural protections.
- The court did not rule out mandamus relief at the pleading stage, treating it as potentially available if plaintiffs could prove a clear legal duty and lack of an adequate alternative remedy.

## Legal Principles

- A declaratory judgment action may be used to test the legality of an agency practice where plaintiffs plead a real dispute over statutory authority and available process.
- Conciliation under G.L. c. 152 is an informal step intended to attempt resolution and channel disputes forward when unresolved; absent authorization, it is not a merits adjudication that finally disposes of claims.
- When an agency practice effectively ends a benefits claim without procedures that meaningfully reduce the risk of error, a complaint may state a procedural due process claim sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
- Relief in the nature of mandamus may be available to compel performance of a clear, non-discretionary legal duty when no adequate alternative remedy exists; dismissal is not appropriate where those elements are plausibly pleaded.
- On a motion to dismiss, the court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and asks whether the complaint states a plausible basis for relief.

## Conclusion

*Nolan* allowed injured workers’ claims against the DIA Commissioner and senior judge to proceed where they alleged that conciliators and the senior judge used conciliation-stage “withdrawals” to terminate claims based on documentation or party-joinder demands, potentially without statutory authority and without adequate procedures, making declaratory relief, possible mandamus relief, and due process claims viable at the pleading stage.


Nolan v. Commissioner of Department of Industrial Accidents, 26 Mass. L. Rptr. 88 (2009)