North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)

Facts

  • Henry C. Alford was indicted in North Carolina for first-degree murder, a capital offense.
  • Under state law, a guilty plea to first-degree murder meant life imprisonment; a jury conviction could yield the death penalty unless the jury recommended life.
  • Alford’s appointed counsel investigated and advised that the prosecution’s evidence was strong, including witness testimony that Alford threatened to kill the victim and later claimed he had done so.
  • The prosecutor agreed to accept a plea to second-degree murder, which carried a lower sentencing range.
  • At the plea hearing, the trial judge heard evidence indicating guilt.
  • Alford pleaded guilty to second-degree murder while expressly denying that he committed the killing, stating he pleaded to avoid the death penalty.
  • The trial court found the plea voluntary and sentenced Alford to 30 years’ imprisonment.

Issues

  1. Whether due process permits acceptance of a guilty plea when the defendant maintains innocence but pleads guilty to avoid the risk of a death sentence.
  2. What constitutional conditions must exist for such a plea to be valid, including whether the record must show a strong factual basis and a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent choice.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and remanded, thereby permitting the conviction to stand.
  • The Court held there was no constitutional error in accepting Alford’s plea despite his protestations of innocence.
  • The Court ruled that a plea entered to avoid a possible death sentence is not constitutionally involuntary solely for that reason.
  • The Court concluded the record supported that Alford, with competent counsel, made a voluntary and intelligent choice among available alternatives and that the court had a strong factual basis for the plea.
  • Justice Black concurred in the judgment.
  • Justice Brennan dissented (joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall), reasoning that the threat of death can overbear the will and render such pleas constitutionally suspect.
  • A guilty plea is constitutionally valid if it is entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently as a choice among available alternatives, particularly when made on advice of competent counsel.
  • A plea is not “compelled” in the constitutional sense merely because it was motivated by a desire to avoid a more severe penalty, including the death penalty.
  • A court may accept a guilty plea from a defendant who does not admit participation in the charged acts, including a plea accompanied by an assertion of innocence, if the record shows a strong factual basis for guilt.
  • The Constitution does not bar states from accepting pleas to lesser-included offenses under these conditions.

Conclusion

The Court upheld the acceptance of a guilty plea entered to avoid capital exposure even though the defendant denied guilt, so long as the plea was a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent decision supported by a strong factual basis; this practice became known as an “Alford plea.”