## Facts

- Springfield, Illinois enacted a municipal ordinance applicable in its “downtown historic district,” a small area containing major commercial and government destinations.
- The ordinance defined “panhandling” as “an oral request for an immediate donation of money” and prohibited panhandling in the district.
- The ordinance permitted signs requesting money and oral requests for donations to be made later.
- Don Norton and Karen Otterson engaged in face-to-face requests for immediate donations in the district and were cited under the ordinance.
- They sued, alleging the ordinance violated the First Amendment, and sought a preliminary injunction barring enforcement.
- The district court denied preliminary injunctive relief, and a Seventh Circuit panel initially affirmed.
- While rehearing was pending, the Supreme Court decided Reed v. Town of Gilbert, clarifying that facial subject-matter distinctions are content-based and subject to strict scrutiny.
- On rehearing, the Seventh Circuit vacated its prior decision and reconsidered the ordinance under Reed.

## Issues

1. Whether an ordinance banning only oral requests for immediate donations, while allowing other solicitations, is a content-based restriction on speech in a public forum.
2. If content-based, whether the ordinance survives strict scrutiny as narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.
3. Whether plaintiffs were entitled to preliminary injunctive relief against enforcement of the ordinance.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit granted rehearing, vacated its prior opinion, reversed the denial of a preliminary injunction, and remanded.
- The court held the ordinance was content-based on its face because enforcement depended on the topic and terms of the request (an immediate donation of money).
- Applying strict scrutiny, the court concluded the city had not justified the content-based distinction as narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.
- The court directed entry of relief consistent with Reed, effectively barring enforcement of the challenged provision.

## Legal Principles

- A law is content-based if it applies to speech because of the topic discussed or message expressed; facial subject-matter distinctions trigger strict scrutiny even without viewpoint discrimination or improper motive.
- In traditional public forums, content-based speech restrictions are presumptively invalid and may stand only if narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.
- An ordinance that requires officials to examine what a speaker says to determine legality is strong evidence of facial content discrimination.
- The availability of alternative channels (e.g., signs or deferred-donation requests) does not cure a facially content-based restriction.

## Conclusion

The court held that Springfield’s selective ban on oral requests for immediate donations regulated speech by subject matter, triggering strict scrutiny under Reed and rendering the ordinance unconstitutional under the First Amendment.


Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2015)