## Facts

- A local newspaper published an article describing contentious exchanges involving the Parkersburg Borough Council.
- The article reported statements by council member William T. Glenn, Sr. accusing the council president and the borough mayor of homosexuality and child molestation, including allegations of sexual conduct and unwanted sexual contact.
- The article also reported the council president’s response, expressing that Glenn’s comments were “bizarre” and that Glenn needed help.
- The council president, the mayor, and the borough solicitor sued Glenn and the newspaper, its reporter, and its owner for defamation based on the republication of Glenn’s accusations.
- The trial court granted summary judgment to the media defendants on a “neutral reportage” theory (accurate, disinterested reporting of newsworthy accusations by a responsible speaker about a public figure).
- The intermediate appellate court reversed, holding Pennsylvania law did not support such a constitutional privilege.

## Issues

1. Whether the United States Constitution requires recognition of a “neutral reportage” privilege protecting the press from defamation liability for accurate and disinterested republication of defamatory accusations made by one public figure about another.
2. Whether the Pennsylvania Constitution independently requires recognition of a neutral reportage privilege in such circumstances.
3. Whether summary judgment for the media defendants was proper based solely on neutral reportage, rather than conventional First Amendment defamation standards.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that neither the First Amendment nor the Pennsylvania Constitution encompasses or requires a neutral reportage privilege.
- The court declined to adopt a constitutional neutral reportage doctrine that would categorically shield the press for neutral republication of defamatory charges.
- The court affirmed the order reversing summary judgment for the media defendants.
- The case was remanded for further proceedings under ordinary defamation rules and constitutional protections (without a neutral reportage defense).

## Legal Principles

- Pennsylvania does not recognize a constitutional neutral reportage privilege insulating media defendants from liability for republication of defamatory accusations, even if the report is accurate and presented without endorsement.
- Existing constitutional defamation doctrine—including the actual-malice requirement for public officials and public figures—sets the applicable limits on defamation liability; courts will not add a freestanding, newsworthiness-based immunity.
- A privilege that immunizes republication of damaging allegations risks permitting the press to disseminate known or suspected falsehoods merely because they are part of a public controversy, contrary to Pennsylvania’s protection of reputation.

## Conclusion

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to constitutionalize a neutral reportage privilege and required defamation claims arising from press republication of third-party accusations to proceed under established First Amendment and state defamation standards, rather than a categorical “neutral” republication shield.


Norton v. Glenn, 860 A.2d 48 (Pa. 2004)