## Facts

- Women’s organizations, abortion providers, and affiliated individuals sued anti-abortion protest leaders and groups to stop planned clinic blockades and harassment at New York City reproductive health facilities.
- A state court issued a temporary restraining order barring obstruction and certain protest conduct; the case was removed to federal court, which issued its own TRO with coercive fines for violations.
- Defendants violated the TRO and later a permanent injunction prohibiting blocking entrances and harassing patients and staff.
- The district court held defendants in contempt and imposed non-compensatory, coercive fines, allowing an opportunity to purge contempt.
- On remand, the district court modified the sanctions to include a purge clause allowing defendants to avoid accumulated fines by complying with the injunction and publicly stating an intent to obey going forward.
- The district court reinstated the contempt sanctions (as modified) and reinstated attorney’s fee awards for (1) prosecuting contempt and (2) prevailing in underlying civil-rights claims.
- Defendants appealed the reinstated contempt sanctions and fee awards.

## Issues

1. Whether the reinstated contempt sanctions were moot due to years of claimed compliance or the enactment of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE).
2. Whether the fines were criminal contempt sanctions requiring criminal procedural safeguards, rather than civil coercive sanctions.
3. Whether the district court could award and reinstate attorney’s fees incurred in prosecuting contempt motions.
4. Whether plaintiffs were entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as prevailing parties.
5. Whether reinstatement of sanctions and fees was time-barred by limitations principles or laches.

## Decision

- The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s reinstated contempt sanctions and attorney’s fee awards.
- The controversy was not moot because the injunction remained operative and the purge clause left an ongoing, enforceable dispute over compliance and payment.
- The fines were civil coercive sanctions because they were conditional and avoidable through compliance and the specified purge steps.
- The district court properly reinstated attorney’s fees for contempt enforcement as compensatory relief for the costs of securing compliance.
- Plaintiffs qualified as prevailing parties for § 1988 fees because the injunction materially altered the parties’ legal relationship by restraining defendants’ conduct.
- Reinstatement was not time-barred where the district court acted within its continuing authority to enforce prior orders.

## Legal Principles

- Civil contempt sanctions are characterized by their conditional, prospective operation; a realistic purge opportunity indicates a coercive civil sanction rather than a punitive criminal one.
- A contempt dispute is not moot where an injunction remains in force and sanctions remain subject to present enforcement or purging conditions.
- Courts may award attorney’s fees as compensation for losses caused by contempt, including reasonable fees incurred to obtain compliance with court orders.
- Injunctive relief that materially changes the parties’ legal relationship can support prevailing-party status and fee awards under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
- The enactment of a later federal statute addressing similar conduct does not, by itself, eliminate a court’s authority to enforce an existing injunction and related contempt remedies.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit upheld the district court’s reinstated civil contempt fines because the sanctions were coercive and purgeable, the dispute remained live, and the district court had authority to compensate plaintiffs through attorney’s fees for both contempt enforcement and prevailing civil-rights relief.


N.Y. State Nat’l Org. for Women v. Terry, 159 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 1998)