## Facts

- Eugene O’Connor sued the Pennsylvania Railroad Co. after slipping and falling on an exterior terrace at New York’s Pennsylvania Station in Manhattan.
- The terrace functioned as a public approach area to the station and was exposed to winter weather conditions.
- O’Connor fell at about 7:20 a.m. on February 16, 1958, while snow was falling.
- He testified that he slipped on ice coating the terrace and described the ice as “rugged” and dirty.
- O’Connor initially filed suit in New York state court; the Railroad removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction.
- The Railroad’s potential liability turned on whether the ice condition existed long enough before the fall (for example, from an earlier storm) to give the Railroad a reasonable opportunity to discover and remove it, as opposed to being a product of the snowstorm then in progress.
- Weather Bureau records indicated that only small amounts of snow fell in the days before the incident, but that a substantial amount fell shortly before O’Connor’s fall.
- A jury returned a verdict for O’Connor.
- The district court granted the Railroad judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), and O’Connor appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence permitted a reasonable jury to find that the ice on the station terrace existed from a prior storm (and thus long enough to charge the Railroad with notice and an opportunity to remedy), rather than being attributable to the snowfall occurring at the time of the accident.
2. Whether the district court properly entered JNOV under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) after the plaintiff’s verdict.

## Decision

- The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the Railroad.
- The court concluded that the record did not support a non-speculative finding that the ice predated the active storm in a way that would have given the Railroad a reasonable time to discover and remove it.
- The court treated O’Connor’s description of the ice as dirty and “rugged” as insufficient, standing alone, to establish that the ice must have been left from an earlier storm, particularly in light of the Weather Bureau data showing significant snowfall shortly before the fall.
- Because the plaintiff’s theory of liability depended on proving the condition was not merely the product of the storm then underway, and the proof did not adequately support that point, the verdict could not stand under Rule 50(b).

## Legal Principles

- In a slip-and-fall case based on snow or ice, a property owner is generally liable only if it created the hazardous condition or had actual or constructive notice of it and a reasonable chance to correct it.
- Where a storm is in progress, liability commonly depends on proof that the condition existed long enough before the accident (including from an earlier storm or accumulation) to permit discovery and remediation within a reasonable time.
- A jury may not base liability on conjecture; the plaintiff must present evidence that allows a reasonable inference—rather than a guess—about when and how the dangerous condition formed.
- Judgment notwithstanding the verdict is appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, no reasonable jury could find for that party on an essential element of the claim.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit affirmed JNOV because O’Connor’s recovery depended on showing the terrace ice was not simply the result of the snowfall occurring at the time of his fall, and the evidence—especially the Weather Bureau records—did not support a reasonable finding that the Railroad had notice and sufficient time to remedy an older, preexisting ice condition.


O'Connor v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 308 F.2d 911 (1962)