## Facts

- The parties had a multi-year domestic relationship that produced a child and disputes over financial arrangements.
- González sued O’Farrill for breach of two agreements: (1) a written promise to pay her $5,000 per month, and (2) an oral agreement allocating obligations for purchasing and financing a San Antonio home.
- The July 5, 1994 writing (signed by O’Farrill) was a promise to pay $5,000 monthly; it stated no duration and did not recite any exchange by González.
- At a bench trial, González testified that the monthly payments were in exchange for her agreement to live in San Antonio with the child and stay home rather than work, and that the arrangement was intended to cover the child’s early years.
- González testified that she performed her part (staying home with the child) and that O’Farrill stopped making the monthly payments after several months.
- On the home arrangement, González testified she paid a substantial down payment and O’Farrill agreed to make the mortgage payments; after about two years he stopped paying.
- O’Farrill did not appear at trial; the court entered judgment for González for $200,000 in contract damages, plus trial attorney’s fees and conditional appellate attorney’s fees, including interest.
- On rehearing, the appellate court reconsidered attorney’s-fee sufficiency challenges after concluding such challenges need not be preserved in a non-jury trial.

## Issues

1. Whether the $5,000-per-month writing was enforceable despite missing terms on consideration and duration, and whether parol evidence could supply those terms.
2. Whether the monthly-payment agreement failed for indefiniteness because it lacked an express duration.
3. Whether the statute of frauds barred enforcement of either the monthly-payment agreement (one-year provision) or the oral home-related agreement (real property/extended performance).
4. Whether legally and factually sufficient evidence supported findings of contract formation, breach, damages, and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees (including conditional appellate fees).
5. From what date post-judgment interest should accrue on conditional appellate attorney’s fees.

## Decision

- The court affirmed the judgment on liability and damages for breach of both agreements.
- The court held the evidence was sufficient to support the attorney’s-fee award and rejected challenges to the amount of fees.
- The court modified the judgment only as to interest on appellate attorney’s fees, holding interest accrues from the date the appeal is perfected.
- The court affirmed the judgment as modified.

## Legal Principles

- When a writing is incomplete on its face, extrinsic evidence may be admitted to supply missing contractual terms (such as consideration and duration) so long as it does not contradict the written promise.
- A contract does not fail for indefiniteness solely because duration is unstated if the term can be reasonably determined from the parties’ purpose, context, and performance.
- Under Texas law, the statute of frauds one-year provision applies only to agreements that cannot be performed within one year; mere expectation of longer performance is insufficient.
- In a bench trial, legal and factual sufficiency complaints may be raised on appeal without preservation through post-judgment motions.
- Interest on conditional appellate attorney’s fees accrues from the date the appeal is perfected.

## Conclusion

The court upheld enforcement of a written monthly-support promise and an oral mortgage-payment arrangement based on testimony supplying missing terms and supporting performance and breach, rejected statute-of-frauds defenses, sustained the fee award, and modified the judgment only to correct the interest accrual date for appellate attorney’s fees.


O’Farrill Avila v. González, 974 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998)