## Facts

- A letter carriers’ union local served as the exclusive bargaining representative for carriers in the Richmond, Virginia area and continued organizing nonmembers.
- During an organizing campaign, the union’s newsletter published a “List of Scabs” identifying certain nonunion carriers by name.
- The newsletter also printed a widely known, highly derogatory “definition” of a “scab,” attributed to Jack London, using figurative and abusive imagery.
- The named nonunion carriers sued in Virginia state court for libel based on being labeled “scabs” and associated with the quoted passage.
- The trial court allowed the claims to proceed and instructed the jury on “actual malice” using a common-law motive-based definition (e.g., spite, ill will, desire to injure), rather than a knowledge-of-falsity standard.
- The jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages; the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed.

## Issues

1. Whether federal labor policy preempts state libel law in labor disputes unless the plaintiff proves “actual malice” as defined by New York Times v. Sullivan (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth), rather than common-law malice based on ill will.
2. Whether calling nonunion workers “scabs” and reprinting the Jack London “definition” are actionable statements of fact or protected rhetorical hyperbole in a labor dispute.

## Decision

- The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment.
- Federal labor policy permits state libel actions in labor disputes only when the plaintiff proves New York Times–style actual malice (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth).
- The Virginia courts’ motive-based “actual malice” instruction was legally erroneous under the governing federal standard.
- The “scab” label and the Jack London passage were rhetorical hyperbole typical of labor controversy and not reasonably understood as literal factual assertions about misconduct.

## Legal Principles

- State defamation law is preempted in labor-dispute speech to the extent it imposes liability without proof that defamatory factual statements were published with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth.
- “Actual malice” in this setting tracks the New York Times v. Sullivan definition and is not satisfied by proof of hostility, spite, or intent to harm alone.
- In labor disputes, heated and figurative epithets may be protected where a reasonable reader would understand them as hyperbole rather than verifiable factual claims.
- Union free-speech protections in organizing apply in post-recognition activity as well as pre-recognition activity.

## Conclusion

The Court set aside the libel judgments because Virginia applied an improper fault standard and because the challenged “scab” rhetoric, including the Jack London passage, was protected labor-dispute hyperbole absent proof of knowingly or recklessly false assertions of fact.


Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974)