## Facts

- Hillel Oppenheimer and seven other petitioners filed an original petition in Israel’s Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice (HCJ) against the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Health.
- The petition concerned the **Law for Prevention of Nuisances, 5721–1961**, which prohibits causing “substantial or unreasonable” noise, odor, or pollution.
- The statute contemplated enforcement through **implementing regulations** to be issued by the Ministers of Interior and Health, and it used mandatory wording directing that regulations be made.
- Each petitioner alleged he was personally affected by ongoing nuisances (such as persistent noise, foul odors, or air pollution) near his residence.
- The petitioners claimed that the ministers’ **failure to promulgate regulations** made enforcement of the statutory prohibitions difficult or impossible in practice.
- Several petitioners (through counsel) requested that the responsible minister act under the law and issue the required regulations; they received no effective response and no regulations were issued.
- The ministers argued that the law gave them **authority** to enact regulations, but did not impose a **legal duty** to do so, leaving the matter to ministerial discretion.

## Issues

1. Whether the Law for Prevention of Nuisances imposed a **mandatory duty** on the Ministers of Interior and Health to promulgate implementing regulations, or merely granted them discretion to do so.
2. Whether the HCJ may grant relief against **administrative inaction** and compel ministers to exercise a regulation-making power when the absence of regulations prevents the statute from operating effectively.
3. Whether prolonged non-issuance of regulations that are necessary for enforcement can be treated as unlawful because it effectively leaves the statute as a “dead letter.”

## Decision

- The HCJ held that, in the statutory context, the ministers’ regulation-making authority was **a duty, not a matter of choice**.
- The Court rejected the claim that the ministers could indefinitely refrain from issuing regulations where the legislature contemplated regulations as part of the statute’s implementation.
- The Court concluded that regulations required for the statute’s effective operation must be made **within a reasonable time**, so that the Knesset’s enactment is not rendered ineffective through executive inaction.
- Relief was granted in substance: the ministers were required to proceed to prepare and promulgate the necessary regulations to implement the nuisance-prevention statute.

## Legal Principles

- A regulation-making power can be construed as **mandatory** where the statutory scheme shows that subordinate legislation is needed for the law to function and be enforced.
- Executive inaction is reviewable in HCJ proceedings; courts may intervene not only against unlawful acts, but also against **unlawful failures to act**, especially where inaction defeats the legislature’s plan.
- Statutory interpretation may treat “may”-type language in a regulation clause as adding scope to an obligation, rather than canceling a duty imposed elsewhere in the provision.
- The executive branch may not nullify an enacted statute in practice by withholding necessary regulations; doing so conflicts with the basic requirement that enacted law be capable of enforcement.
- Where a legal duty exists, the HCJ may issue public-law remedies (including mandatory orders) to require the competent authority to carry out the duty.

## Conclusion

*Oppenheimer* is a leading HCJ decision on ministerial inaction: when primary legislation contemplates implementing regulations and cannot operate effectively without them, the responsible ministers have a legal duty to promulgate regulations within a reasonable time, and the Court may compel performance to prevent the statute from becoming unenforceable in practice.


Oppenheimer v. Ministers of Interior and of Health, HCJ 295/65, 20(1) PD 309 (1966)