Facts
- A neighborhood community group in Chicago opposed a real estate broker’s alleged “blockbusting” and “panic peddling” practices.
- Group members distributed leaflets in the broker’s home suburb criticizing his alleged conduct and urging residents to pressure him to change it.
- The broker claimed the leaflets invaded his privacy and were coercive and intimidating rather than informational.
- An Illinois trial court entered an injunction barring the group from distributing any literature in the suburb; the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed.
- The injunction remained in effect for more than three years before Supreme Court review.
Issues
- Whether an injunction prohibiting peaceful leaflet distribution criticizing a person’s business practices, based on asserted privacy invasion and coercion, violates the First Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
- Whether the respondent carried the burden required to justify a prior restraint on expression.
Decision
- The Supreme Court reversed, holding the injunction unconstitutional.
- The injunction was a prior restraint on protected expression and therefore carried a heavy presumption against validity.
- The respondent failed to meet the heavy burden of justifying the restraint because the record showed peaceful, orderly distribution without violence or breach of the peace.
- The Court rejected the asserted interest in being free from public criticism of business practices as an adequate basis for suppressing speech in advance.
- Justice Harlan dissented on jurisdictional grounds, arguing the state-court order was not sufficiently final for Supreme Court review.
Legal Principles
- Prior restraints on expression are presumptively unconstitutional and require a heavy showing of justification by the party seeking the restraint.
- Peaceful pamphleteering on public streets is strongly protected speech, even when intended to influence conduct and even when the message is contentious.
- Claims of privacy invasion, embarrassment, or reputational harm from public criticism of professional conduct generally do not justify an injunction suppressing speech before it occurs.
- Absent extraordinary circumstances (such as threats to public safety or other narrowly recognized exceptions), courts may not enjoin the distribution of informational literature.
Conclusion
The Court held that enjoining peaceful leaflet distribution criticizing a broker’s alleged real estate practices was an unconstitutional prior restraint because the respondent did not provide a sufficient justification to overcome the strong First Amendment protection for public advocacy and criticism.