## Facts

- In February 1983, Michael Osborn, a three-week-old infant, underwent open-heart surgery at UCSF Medical Center and received transfused blood supplied by Irwin Memorial Blood Bank.
- Michael later contracted HIV/AIDS from the transfusion.
- At the time, AIDS was recognized as a serious disease, but HIV had not been isolated and there was no direct test for HIV in donated blood.
- Michael’s parents asked about arranging “directed donations” from family or friends; they were told to contact the blood bank.
- A blood bank receptionist allegedly told the parents that directed donations “were not allowed” or could not be earmarked for Michael.
- Evidence indicated the blood bank’s actual policy was to discourage, not categorically prohibit, directed donations.
- The blood bank asserted Michael had a rare blood type (A negative), that family members were incompatible, and that friends could supply only a small portion of the needed blood.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence supported liability for professional negligence in the blood bank’s 1983 collection, screening, and testing practices.
2. Whether the receptionist’s statement about directed donations constituted negligent misrepresentation.
3. Whether the trial court prejudicially erred by excluding evidence about Michael’s rare blood type and the feasibility/effectiveness of directed donations as to causation.
4. Whether and how California’s MICRA limitations applied to claims against a blood bank arising from furnishing blood for medical treatment.

## Decision

- The court affirmed judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) for the blood bank on the professional-negligence claim, finding insufficient evidence of deviation from the 1983 standard of care.
- The court held there was sufficient evidence to submit negligent misrepresentation based on the categorical statement that directed donations were not allowed when policy merely discouraged them.
- The court reversed the negligent-misrepresentation judgment and remanded for a new trial limited to that theory because exclusion of rare-blood-type/feasibility evidence was prejudicial to proximate-cause analysis.
- The court treated the blood bank as a “health care provider” for certain MICRA purposes as to professional-negligence-based claims, with MICRA’s effect on the remaining theory to be addressed on remand.

## Legal Principles

- Professional negligence is measured by the contemporaneous professional standard of care; liability may not be imposed using hindsight based on later scientific or medical developments.
- Expert testimony that a different approach would have been safer does not establish breach absent proof that the advocated measures were required by the ordinary practice of comparable professionals at the time.
- Negligent misrepresentation may be based on supplying false or misleading information without reasonable care, where justifiable reliance causes damage.
- Causation for misrepresentation requires proof that the misinformation was a substantial factor in producing the injury; evidence bearing directly on whether the alternative course was feasible and outcome-altering must be admitted.
- Exclusion of evidence central to causation can require reversal where a general verdict prevents determining whether the verdict rested on an unaffected theory.

## Conclusion

The court declined to impose negligence liability on a blood bank for early AIDS-era screening decisions absent proof those decisions fell below 1983 professional norms, but required a new trial on negligent misrepresentation because the jury was not permitted to hear key evidence on whether directed donations were realistically available and likely to have prevented the infected transfusion.


Osborn v. Irwin Mem'l Blood Bank, 5 Cal. App. 4th 234 (Ct. App. 1992)