## Facts

- Jay D. Osier (father) and Barbara A. Osier (mother) divorced in Maine in 1976; the decree made no custody order for their minor son.
- By agreement, the mother had physical custody because the father’s naval duties kept him away from home for substantial periods.
- In 1978, after remarrying and establishing a household, the father moved to amend the divorce decree to obtain custody.
- At the custody hearing, the mother, a Jehovah’s Witness, testified she would not consent to a blood transfusion for the child even if medically necessary.
- The District Court treated the transfusion issue as highly significant, found the mother’s beliefs would endanger the child’s physical well-being or life, and awarded custody to the father with visitation to the mother.
- The Superior Court affirmed; the mother appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court (Law Court).

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court gave undue weight to the mother’s religious beliefs—particularly refusal to consent to blood transfusions—in changing custody.
2. To what extent a court may consider a parent’s religious beliefs in a best-interests custody determination consistent with constitutional protections of religious freedom and family relationships.

## Decision

- The Law Court vacated the District Court’s custody order and the Superior Court’s affirmance.
- The court held the District Court gave undue weight to the mother’s religious beliefs regarding blood transfusions as the basis for the custody award.
- The court remanded for a new custody determination applying a best-interests analysis that does not rest on speculative future harm or religious disapproval.

## Legal Principles

- Custody determinations apply the child’s best interests, but courts may not penalize or discriminate against a parent based on religious beliefs absent a demonstrated threat to the child’s welfare.
- Courts may consider the actual or probable effects of religious beliefs or practices on the child, but may not make value judgments about the validity of religious doctrine.
- A hypothetical future medical emergency, without concrete evidence of actual or likely harm, is too speculative to justify changing custody based primarily on a parent’s religiously motivated medical decision-making.
- Where the feared harm concerns emergency medical treatment, legal mechanisms (including court authorization or state intervention) may address the emergency without using custody transfer as the primary remedy.

## Conclusion

The Law Court required that religious factors in custody disputes be tied to non-speculative evidence of actual or probable harm to the child, and it vacated a custody change that effectively treated a parent’s religious refusal of blood transfusions as determinative without such proof.


Osier v. Osier, 410 A.2d 1027 (Me. 1980)