## Facts

- Gloria Hernandez DeAnda Osorno and Henry Osorno met in February 1992.
- In August 1992, Gloria learned she was pregnant; she alleged Henry urged her to have an abortion, which she refused.
- Henry agreed to marry Gloria if she signed a premarital agreement.
- The parties signed an “Agreement in Contemplation of Marriage” on October 9, 1992, and married the next day.
- The agreement primarily treated property as separate and substantially limited Gloria’s financial claims in the event of divorce.
- Henry filed for divorce on December 22, 1998.
- A family law master heard testimony and found the premarital agreement enforceable; the trial court enforced it, denied Gloria’s motion for continuance, and divided the marital estate.
- Gloria appealed, challenging enforceability, denial of continuance, and the property division.

## Issues

1. Whether the premarital agreement was unenforceable under Texas Family Code § 4.006(a) because Gloria did not sign it voluntarily (duress).
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Gloria’s motion for continuance.
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the community estate, requiring appellate correction.

## Decision

- The court affirmed enforcement of the premarital agreement.
- The court held Gloria failed to prove involuntariness under Texas Family Code § 4.006(a).
- The court affirmed the denial of Gloria’s motion for continuance as within the trial court’s discretion.
- The court reversed and remanded in part regarding the division of the marital estate for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

## Legal Principles

- Under Texas Family Code § 4.006(a), a premarital agreement is unenforceable only if the challenger proves either (1) it was not signed voluntarily, or (2) it was unconscionable and executed without required financial disclosure; the challenger bears the burden.
- Because the Family Code does not define “voluntarily,” courts apply contract-law concepts, including duress.
- Duress requires a threat to do something the threatening party has no legal right to do; a lawful ultimatum generally does not constitute duress.
- Conditioning marriage on signing a premarital agreement, even when the other party faces strong personal pressures (including an unplanned pregnancy), is not duress when there is no legal duty to marry.
- Continuance rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion; reversal requires a record showing the denial likely caused an improper judgment.
- A divorce property division must be “just and right”; appellate courts may reverse if the division reflects an abuse of discretion, including misapplication of an enforceable premarital agreement to particular property.

## Conclusion

The court held the premarital agreement was voluntary because Henry’s condition on marriage was not a wrongful threat under duress doctrine, upheld the trial court’s denial of a continuance, and remanded for correction of aspects of the property division despite the agreement’s enforceability.


Osorno v. Osorno, 76 S.W.3d 509 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002)