## Facts

- Walter Parrish and James Coyle sued Owens Corning Fiberglas Corporation, alleging asbestos exposure from its products caused asbestosis-related lung impairment and shortness of breath; Shirley Parrish asserted derivative claims.
- Both plaintiffs had substantial smoking histories.
- Medical proof indicated asbestos exposure can cause restrictive lung disease and smoking can cause obstructive lung disease; evidence also supported that smoking and asbestos exposure can jointly contribute to the same pulmonary impairment.
- The cases were consolidated for trial.
- The jury was instructed on comparative fault and permitted to consider plaintiffs’ smoking when allocating fault for the claimed lung impairment.
- The jury assigned 50% fault to each plaintiff based on smoking and allocated the remainder among other responsible actors, including Owens Corning.
- Parrish had previously settled an asbestos-related workers’ compensation claim with his employer, Louisville Water Company (LWC), which was not joined in the tort action.
- The trial court nevertheless placed LWC on the verdict form, and the jury apportioned 10% fault to LWC in Parrish’s case.
- The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, concluding smoking should not reduce recovery for asbestos-related disease and disapproving apportionment to LWC as a nonparty employer with a workers’ compensation settlement.

## Issues

1. When asbestos exposure and cigarette smoking combine to produce a single lung impairment, may the jury treat the plaintiff’s smoking as comparative fault in allocating responsibility for that injury?
2. May a jury apportion fault to a nonparty employer that resolved its liability through a workers’ compensation settlement related to the same injury?

## Decision

- The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment.
- The court held the jury could consider smoking as comparative fault because the proof supported a single, indivisible harm (lung impairment and shortness of breath) caused by combined exposures.
- The court held apportionment to LWC was proper because the workers’ compensation settlement was treated as equivalent to a settlement with a nonparty against whom a claim had been asserted, permitting fault allocation under Kentucky’s apportionment scheme.

## Legal Principles

- When multiple causal factors combine to produce one indivisible injury, Kentucky comparative fault permits allocation of fault among all responsible actors, including the plaintiff.
- A plaintiff’s conduct (including continued smoking) may constitute “fault” for comparative-fault allocation when it contributes to the same injury for which damages are sought.
- For comparative fault purposes, “fault” and “negligence” are treated as interchangeable concepts in allocating responsibility for a single injury.
- A workers’ compensation settlement related to the injury may be treated as the functional equivalent of a settlement with a nonparty, allowing the jury to allocate a percentage of fault to the employer even if the employer is not a party to the tort action.

## Conclusion

The court required responsibility for a single lung-impairment injury to be allocated across all contributing conduct, allowing juries to reduce asbestos-related recoveries based on plaintiffs’ smoking and to apportion fault to a nonparty employer that settled through workers’ compensation.


Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Parrish, 58 S.W.3d 467 (Ky. 2001)