## Facts

- Packard Motor Car Company employed about 32,000 production workers and roughly 1,100 supervisory personnel (general foremen, foremen, assistant foremen, and special-assignment “trouble-shooters”).
- The production workers had been represented by an industrial union since 1937; the foremen supervised those workers and were responsible for maintaining production quantity and quality.
- Although a labor relations department handled formal hiring, discharge, and layoff decisions, foremen had authority under company rules to initiate recommendations on promotion, demotion, discipline, and penalties.
- Foremen, as a class, were paid more and received benefits not available to rank-and-file workers (e.g., paid absences and holidays, longer vacations, and severance pay).
- The foremen organized in a union representing supervisory employees exclusively; the NLRB found the foremen group to be an appropriate bargaining unit and certified the union.
- Packard refused to bargain, asserting that foremen were not “employees” protected by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
- The NLRB ordered Packard to bargain; the court of appeals enforced the order; Packard sought Supreme Court review.

## Issues

1. Whether foremen and other supervisory personnel are “employees” under the NLRA and therefore entitled to statutory rights of self-organization and collective bargaining.
2. Whether § 2(2)’s definition of “employer” (“any person acting in the interest of an employer”) excludes supervisory personnel from “employee” status under § 2(3).
3. Whether the NLRB’s determination that foremen constitute an appropriate bargaining unit under § 9(b) may be set aside in an enforcement proceeding.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed enforcement of the NLRB’s order requiring Packard to bargain with the certified union of foremen.
- The Court held that foremen and other supervisory personnel fall within the NLRA’s definition of “employee” in § 2(3).
- The Court rejected the argument that supervisors are excluded because they act in the employer’s interest under § 2(2).
- The Court upheld the Board’s § 9(b) unit determination as within its authority, supported by substantial evidence, and not arbitrary or unreasonable, and therefore not subject to being set aside in a § 10(e) enforcement proceeding.
- The Court stated that objections to the policy wisdom of permitting foremen to organize are for Congress, not the courts.

## Legal Principles

- Under the NLRA as written, supervisory personnel are “employees” under § 2(3) unless expressly excluded by the statute’s enumerated exceptions.
- Section 2(2)’s inclusion of persons “acting in the interest of an employer” functions to attribute agency responsibility to the employer for labor-law violations; it does not strip such persons of statutory employee rights.
- The NLRB has primary authority under § 9(b) to determine appropriate bargaining units; courts defer to those determinations in enforcement proceedings unless the Board exceeds its authority, lacks substantial evidentiary support, or acts arbitrarily or unreasonably.
- Courts will not rewrite statutory coverage based on asserted conflicts of loyalty or other managerial policy concerns; such changes must come from legislative amendment.

## Conclusion

The Court held that foremen, though supervisory, were statutory employees entitled to organize and bargain collectively, and it enforced the NLRB’s certification of a foremen-only unit and the resulting duty of the employer to bargain.


Packard Motor Car Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 485 (1947)