Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001)

Facts

  • A corporation formed by Anthony Palazzolo and others bought undeveloped waterfront land in Rhode Island, most of which was coastal salt marsh subject to tidal flooding.

  • Rhode Island later created the Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC) and adopted regulations treating salt marsh as protected coastal wetlands with sharply limited development.

  • The corporation’s charter was revoked, and title passed to Palazzolo as sole shareholder.

  • Palazzolo sought CRMC permission to fill and develop the marsh:

    • In 1983, he applied to construct a bulkhead and fill the entire marsh; CRMC denied the request as inadequate and inconsistent with wetlands protections.
    • In 1985, he proposed filling 11 wetland acres for a private beach club; CRMC denied the request because it did not satisfy the “special exception” standard requiring a compelling public purpose.
  • Palazzolo sued for inverse condemnation, claiming the permit denials and wetlands restrictions effected a taking without just compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

  • State-court evidence showed the parcel included an upland portion of about one acre suitable for at least one single-family residence, valued at roughly $200,000.

Issues

  1. Whether the takings claim was unripe because Palazzolo had not pursued additional or alternative development proposals.
  2. Whether acquiring title after enactment of the wetlands regulations barred Palazzolo from asserting a regulatory takings claim based on those regulations.
  3. Whether the regulations and permit denials caused a Lucas-type total taking by eliminating all economically beneficial use.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court held the takings claim was ripe because the 1985 denial reflected a final, definitive application of the regulations to the property.
  • The Court rejected a categorical bar on takings claims by post-regulation purchasers; acquiring title after regulation does not forfeit the right to assert a Takings Clause claim.
  • The Court held no total taking occurred because the parcel retained economically beneficial use through the developable upland area.
  • The Court reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings, leaving any partial-taking claim to be assessed under Penn Central.
  • A regulatory takings claim becomes ripe when the relevant agency has reached a final, definitive position on the permitted use of the property; the owner need not submit serial, marginally revised applications once the agency’s position is clear.
  • Transfer of title after enactment of a land-use regulation does not categorically bar a takings claim; constitutional protections are not extinguished by a change in ownership.
  • Lucas’s categorical rule applies only when regulation leaves no economically beneficial or productive use of the property; if any significant beneficial use remains, the claim is not a total taking.
  • The total-taking inquiry considers the parcel as a whole rather than isolating the regulated portion; where value remains, analysis proceeds under Penn Central’s multifactor framework.
  • Background principles of state property and nuisance law remain relevant to defining the property interests against which a takings claim is measured.

Conclusion

The Court held that a definitive denial of a concrete development proposal can ripen a regulatory takings claim, and that post-regulation acquisition does not bar such claims, but it found no Lucas total taking because the property retained viable residential use and remanded for any partial-taking analysis under Penn Central.