Facts
- Richard Palermo injured his right knee at work and was treated by an orthopedic surgeon, who recommended ACL reconstruction using a human-tissue allograft.
- LifeLink Foundation, Inc., a nonprofit tissue bank, filled an order for a tibialis tendon-anterior allograft and conducted donor-history review and testing under its protocols.
- LifeLink shipped the allograft to a distributor, which forwarded it to a Mississippi surgery center.
- The surgeon implanted the allograft during Palermo’s knee surgery.
- Palermo developed a post-operative knee infection; the surgeon later removed the allograft, after which the infection subsided.
- Testing on the removed allograft reportedly showed no bacteria.
- The Palermos alleged the allograft was contaminated and that LifeLink’s procurement, processing, storage, or distribution caused the infection and resulting damages.
Issues
- Whether Mississippi’s blood-shield statute, which characterizes certain activities involving human tissue as a “service” rather than a “sale,” prevents strict products-liability claims against a tissue bank under the Mississippi Products Liability Act (MPLA).
- Whether the Palermos produced sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that LifeLink negligently breached a duty in handling the allograft and that such breach caused Palermo’s infection.
Decision
- The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for LifeLink.
- The court held the blood-shield statute applied to LifeLink’s procurement and distribution of the allograft, classifying the conduct as a service and barring MPLA strict products-liability claims.
- The court held the negligence claims failed because the Palermos did not present competent evidence that LifeLink breached the applicable standard of care or that LifeLink’s conduct proximately caused the infection.
Legal Principles
- Under Mississippi’s blood-shield statute, the procurement, processing, storage, distribution, or use of human tissue for treatment is treated as a service, not a sale, and the provider is not liable as a “seller” under strict-liability product theories.
- MPLA strict products liability applies to manufacturers, designers, and sellers of products; entities statutorily classified as service providers for human-tissue activities are outside that strict-liability framework.
- Negligence claims against tissue banks are not categorically barred, but plaintiffs must present admissible evidence—typically including expert proof—of duty, breach of the standard of care, and proximate causation.
- Speculation or temporal association between implantation and infection, without competent evidence linking the infection to the tissue bank’s handling of the tissue, is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.
Conclusion
The court affirmed judgment for the tissue bank, concluding that Mississippi law treats the distribution of human tissue for transplantation as a service that is not subject to MPLA strict products liability, and that the plaintiffs’ negligence claims failed because they lacked proof of breach and causation attributable to the tissue bank.