## Facts

- Charles City College ran a fundraising campaign called the “College Founder’s Fund.”
- Philip Bissonnette, Jr. signed a printed pledge form stating he “intend[ed] to subscribe” $5,000 and “intend[ed] to pay” annually over a stated period beginning in 1967.
- Bissonnette paid $1,000 in 1967 and $1,000 in 1968.
- The college closed in May 1968.
- Bissonnette made no further payments and died on May 15, 1969.
- The college’s receiver sued the estate’s executor to recover the unpaid balance (about $3,000).
- The case was tried solely on the pledge form; no extrinsic evidence was offered about the campaign, the parties’ intent, or reliance.

## Issues

1. Whether a charitable pledge form stating the donor “intend[s]” to subscribe and “intend[s]” to pay, without extrinsic evidence, constitutes an enforceable contractual promise against the donor’s estate.

## Decision

- The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the judgment denying enforcement of the pledge.
- The court held the pledge form, standing alone, did not show a legally obligatory promise to pay the remaining balance.
- Because no evidence beyond the document was introduced to clarify meaning or show a basis for enforcement, the estate was not liable for the unpaid amount.

## Legal Principles

- An enforceable contract requires a definite promissory undertaking; language framed as future intention (“intend”) is not, by itself, a binding promise.
- When a written instrument is ambiguous or arguably precatory, extrinsic evidence may be used to interpret intent; absent such evidence, the court applies the instrument’s ordinary meaning.
- A charitable subscription is not enforceable on the bare writing alone where the record does not show promissory intent, consideration, or facts supporting enforcement based on reliance.

## Conclusion

The court refused to enforce a charitable pledge against a decedent’s estate where the pledge instrument used “intent” language and the plaintiff offered no extrinsic evidence establishing that the donor intended to be legally bound or that the pledge was otherwise enforceable under contract principles.


Pappas v. Bever, 219 N.W.2d 720 (Iowa 1974)