## Facts

- Rosa Parks sued LaFace Records, the rap duo OutKast, and related music entities for using her name as the title of OutKast’s 1998 song “Rosa Parks.”
- Parks alleged the title and marketing suggested her sponsorship or association with the recording.
- Parks asserted claims for (1) Lanham Act § 43(a) false endorsement/false advertising, (2) Michigan common-law right of publicity, (3) defamation, and (4) tortious interference with business relationships.
- Defendants denied liability and argued the First Amendment protected the use of “Rosa Parks” as an artistic title.
- The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on all claims, reasoning Parks failed to establish the statutory and state-law violations and that artistic expression independently barred liability.
- Parks appealed.

## Issues

1. What First Amendment standard governs Lanham Act § 43(a) and Michigan right-of-publicity claims challenging the use of a person’s name in the title of an expressive work.
2. Whether summary judgment was proper on the Lanham Act and right-of-publicity claims given disputes about the title’s artistic relevance and whether it explicitly misled consumers.
3. Whether the song and related conduct supported defamation under Michigan law.
4. Whether Parks produced sufficient evidence of tortious interference with business relationships under Michigan law.

## Decision

- The Sixth Circuit adopted the *Rogers v. Grimaldi* test for challenges to the titles of expressive works under both Lanham Act § 43(a) and Michigan’s common-law right of publicity.
- The court reversed summary judgment on the Lanham Act and right-of-publicity claims because genuine disputes of material fact existed on *Rogers*’s elements, including the relationship between the title and the song’s content and whether the title explicitly misled as to source or content.
- The court rejected treating the First Amendment as an absolute bar at the summary-judgment stage where the *Rogers* inquiries turn on unresolved factual questions.
- The court affirmed summary judgment for defendants on defamation because the lyrics were not reasonably interpretable as stating actual facts “of and concerning” Parks.
- The court affirmed summary judgment on tortious interference because Parks did not present sufficient evidence of intentional interference and resulting damages.

## Legal Principles

- For titles of expressive works, Lanham Act and similar state-law identity-based claims are evaluated under *Rogers v. Grimaldi*: liability generally requires either (1) no artistic relevance between the title and the work or (2) an explicitly misleading title as to source or content.
- Traditional likelihood-of-confusion analysis may be inadequate for expressive titles because it can undervalue First Amendment interests.
- When artistic relevance or explicit misleadingness depends on contested facts, summary judgment is improper.
- Defamation requires an actionable statement of fact; expressive lyrics that cannot reasonably be read as asserting actual facts about the plaintiff do not satisfy this element.
- Tortious interference requires proof of intentional interference and damages; conclusory allegations or insufficient evidence cannot defeat summary judgment.

## Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit held that disputes over whether the song title “Rosa Parks” was artistically relevant and whether it explicitly misled consumers required further proceedings on Parks’s Lanham Act and right-of-publicity claims, while her defamation and tortious-interference claims failed as a matter of law on the record presented.


Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003)