## Facts

- After a constructive vote of no confidence, Helmut Kohl became Federal Chancellor and sought early federal elections despite having a workable parliamentary majority.
- The constitutional system did not allow the Bundestag to dissolve itself; dissolution could occur only through the mechanism requiring a failed vote of confidence initiated by the Chancellor.
- The Chancellor requested a vote of confidence and arranged for coalition members to abstain so that the motion would fail.
- Following the failed confidence vote, the Chancellor requested dissolution, and the Federal President ordered dissolution and called early elections.
- Opposition members of the Bundestag filed an inter-organ dispute action, alleging that the dissolution unlawfully shortened the legislative term and violated their constitutionally protected status as members of parliament.

## Issues

1. Whether individual members of parliament have standing in inter-organ dispute proceedings to challenge a dissolution order as an infringement of rights tied to parliamentary status, including the constitutional protection of the legislative term.
2. Whether a dissolution order issued after a failed confidence vote is subject to constitutional review, or instead is a nonjusticiable political decision.
3. Whether a Chancellor may lawfully trigger dissolution by intentionally losing a confidence vote when he still has a factual majority, and what substantive limits apply to using the confidence mechanism to obtain early elections.

## Decision

- The court held that individual members of the Bundestag had standing to assert violations of rights constitutionally linked to their status as members of parliament, including the guarantee of the legislative term.
- The court held that dissolution under the confidence-vote mechanism is reviewable for compliance with constitutional prerequisites, even though the decision involves a key political judgment.
- The court recognized broad presidential discretion to dissolve (or refuse to dissolve) only if the constitutional conditions for dissolution are satisfied at the time of decision.
- Applying its criteria, the court upheld the dissolution order and dismissed the applications, accepting that the Chancellor could reasonably regard his capacity to govern as politically impaired and that the President did not exceed his discretion.

## Legal Principles

- Members of parliament may bring inter-organ dispute proceedings to vindicate individual rights tied to parliamentary status, including protection against unconstitutional curtailment of the legislative term.
- The dissolution mechanism is an open-textured constitutional norm requiring interpretation consistent with constitutional values; its application is not insulated from judicial review merely because it involves political assessment.
- Dissolution through the confidence mechanism operates as a staged process; illegality at an earlier stage (e.g., misuse of the confidence vote) can invalidate the later presidential dissolution decision.
- “Confidence” in this context means present parliamentary endorsement of the Chancellor as formally expressed through the vote, not merely the Chancellor’s subjective assessment.
- The Chancellor may resort to the dissolution mechanism only when continued governance is no longer politically assured under existing parliamentary power relations—i.e., when governability is sufficiently impaired to prevent pursuing policy with continuous majority confidence.
- The President’s discretion is conditioned on verifying that the constitutional prerequisites for dissolution exist; courts review whether those prerequisites were present while allowing a margin for political evaluation.

## Conclusion

The court sustained an early dissolution following an intentionally lost confidence vote by holding that MPs could challenge dissolution as a status-rights violation, that dissolution decisions are constitutionally reviewable, and that dissolution is permissible only where governability is genuinely impaired and the President reasonably finds the constitutional prerequisites satisfied.


Parliamentary Dissolution Case, 62 BVerfGE 1 (BVerfG 1983)