Partington v Attorney-General (1869) LR 4 HL 100

Facts

• Section 2 of the Succession Duty Act 1853 imposed a duty on certain transfers of personal property that passed upon death.
• Mr. Partington became entitled to a sum of money under the provisions of his great-aunt’s will.
• The Inland Revenue maintained that the sum fell within the statutory definition of a “succession” and was therefore chargeable.
• Mr. Partington resisted assessment and paid the tax only under protest, contending that the receipt did not qualify as a taxable succession because the Act dealt primarily with immediate lineal successors and direct descendants rather than more remote beneficiaries.
• The language of the Act was incomplete: it defined “succession” in general terms but left several situations—such as gifts to collateral relatives—only partially addressed.
• The taxing authorities relied on what they regarded as the overall purpose of the legislation (to tax benefits received on death) and invited the courts to adopt an expansive construction.
• Mr. Partington’s position was that Parliament could, if it wished, bring his inheritance within the charge, but until it used express words to that effect the Crown had no right to levy duty.
• The dispute proceeded through the Court of Exchequer and Exchequer Chamber before reaching the appellate committee of the House of Lords, where Lord Cairns LC delivered the leading speech.

Issues

1. Does the benefit passing to Mr. Partington fall within the meaning of “succession” in Section 2 of the Succession Duty Act 1853?
2. When the text of a taxing statute is ambiguous, should the benefit of the doubt go to the subject or to the revenue?
3. More generally, what is the correct approach to statutory interpretation in matters of taxation: purposive or strictly textual?

Decision

• By a majority, the House of Lords allowed Mr. Partington’s appeal.
• Lord Cairns LC affirmed that liability to tax cannot be inferred from intention or from broad policy aims; it must rest on the ascertainable words of the Act.
• The judge emphasised that the court’s duty is “to look simply to the language used” and to refrain from stretching or straining that language to meet perceived gaps.
• Any ambiguity or real doubt must operate to relieve, not to charge, the subject.
• As the wording of Section 2 did not plainly cover the property transferred to Mr. Partington, the assessment was unlawful and the sum paid under protest had to be returned.

Legal Principles

• Strict construction of fiscal statutes: taxation is an exercise of sovereign power that interferes with private property; therefore, clear statutory authority is indispensable.
• Contra fiscum rule: where competing readings are available, the interpretation less burdensome to the taxpayer prevails.
• The purposive approach—valuable in many areas of law—does not override the requirement for explicit words when the legislature intends to impose a tax.
• The burden of proving a statutory charge lies on the revenue; the taxpayer need not demonstrate exemption, only the absence of clear words imposing liability.
• This case became an early modern articulation of the principle later cited in authorities such as Cape Brandy Syndicate v IRC and Inland Revenue Commissioners v Wesleyan and General Assurance Society.

Conclusion

Partington v Attorney-General clarified that the Crown cannot extend a tax demand beyond the language chosen by Parliament. Where the legislature uses doubtful or incomplete expressions, the subject is entitled to stand upon the literal meaning, and the court is bound to refuse enforcement. The decision remains a landmark in UK revenue law, anchoring the doctrine that taxes are creatures of statute and that ambiguities must be resolved in favour of the citizen.