## Facts

- Kim Patterson worked at Avery Dennison’s Schererville, Indiana facility from 1985 until her termination in 1997.
- She was hired as a general accounting manager, promoted in 1987 to manager of financial planning and analysis, and remained in that role until 1995.
- During a 1995 reorganization, Avery moved Patterson into a temporary logistics task force to support a merger of two logistics divisions.
- The general manager assigned Patterson to design a new logistics computer system and to recommend how the logistics department should be structured going forward.
- Patterson completed the computer-system work and recommended creating a new logistics manager position.
- Avery considered Patterson for the new position but concluded it required more logistics experience and training than she had.
- Avery informed Patterson it had no other available positions matching her background and terminated her employment on January 10, 1997.
- Patterson filed an EEOC charge alleging gender and disability discrimination; after receiving a right-to-sue letter, she sued alleging Title VII gender discrimination based on her termination and non-selection.
- The district court granted summary judgment to Avery on the Title VII claim and denied Patterson’s motion to compel the deposition of Thomas Miller, a high-level executive.
- Patterson appealed the summary judgment and the discovery ruling.

## Issues

1. Whether Patterson produced sufficient evidence under the *McDonnell Douglas* indirect method to establish a prima facie case of Title VII gender discrimination, including showing similarly situated male employees were treated more favorably.
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion to compel the deposition of a senior executive, and whether that denial caused actual and substantial prejudice.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Avery on the Title VII claim.
- The court held Patterson failed to establish a prima facie case because her proposed male comparators were not similarly situated in relevant respects (including responsibilities, experience, and supervision).
- The court accepted Avery’s characterization of Patterson’s logistics task-force role as temporary and ending upon completion of the project’s objectives, with no ongoing duties merely reassigned to others.
- The court found Patterson did not present sufficient evidence that Avery’s stated reason—insufficient logistics experience and training for the new manager role—was pretext for gender discrimination.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to compel the executive deposition, holding there was no abuse of discretion and no showing of actual and substantial prejudice.

## Legal Principles

- Under the *McDonnell Douglas* indirect method, a Title VII plaintiff must present evidence supporting a prima facie case, including that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably.
- “Similarly situated” comparators must be comparable on relevant factors such as job duties, qualifications, and reporting/supervisory structure; superficial similarities are insufficient.
- An employer’s stated qualification-based reason for a selection decision will defeat a claim absent evidence permitting a reasonable inference that the explanation is pretextual.
- A claimed “position elimination” supports an inference of discrimination only where the record supports that the job continued in substance through reassignment of the same functions; elimination of a temporary project-based role may not fit that pattern.
- Discovery rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, and reversal requires a showing that the limitation caused actual and substantial prejudice.

## Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit upheld summary judgment because Patterson did not identify truly comparable male employees or produce evidence that Avery’s stated logistics-qualification rationale was pretextual, and it upheld the discovery ruling because Patterson did not show that compelling a senior executive’s deposition would likely yield material evidence or that its denial prejudiced her ability to oppose summary judgment.


Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2002)