## Facts

- Melissa Patterson obtained a no-contact (protective) order against her fiancé, Gregory Darden, after a domestic battery; the order remained in effect.
- On October 26, 2011, a deputy went to Darden’s residence to serve a subpoena on Patterson and her daughter, found Patterson inside, and learned an active no-contact order existed.
- Patterson said she was “just visiting” and lived elsewhere; Patterson and Darden stated they believed the order had been dismissed.
- Darden was arrested for violating the order, and Patterson was arrested for “aiding in violating the order.”
- On November 18, 2011, officers went to Darden’s residence to execute warrants on him and found Patterson leaving from the rear; she was charged again based on that contact.
- The State charged Patterson with two counts of aiding, inducing, or causing invasion of privacy (Class A misdemeanor) under Indiana Code § 35-46-1-15.1.
- Patterson moved to dismiss, arguing the protected person under the order cannot be criminally liable for aiding, inducing, or causing the restrained person’s violation; the trial court denied the motion.
- The trial court certified an interlocutory appeal; the Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction and consolidated the charges for appeal.

## Issues

1. Whether a person protected by a no-contact order may be criminally liable for aiding, inducing, or causing the restrained person to violate the order under Indiana Code § 35-46-1-15.1.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals of Indiana reversed the denial of Patterson’s motion to dismiss.
- The court held that a protected person under a no-contact order cannot be prosecuted for aiding, inducing, or causing the restrained person’s invasion of privacy.
- The case was remanded with instructions to dismiss both counts.

## Legal Principles

- Statutes governing violations of protective/no-contact orders are directed at restraining and penalizing the person bound by the order, not the person the order protects.
- When a criminal statute is enacted to protect a defined class, members of that protected class generally are not subject to accomplice liability for the offense committed against them, even if they consent to or invite the conduct.
- A protected person’s invitation or consent to contact does not nullify or modify a protective order and does not relieve the restrained person of criminal responsibility; the compliance burden remains on the restrained person.
- Construing the invasion-of-privacy statute to permit accomplice liability against the protected person would conflict with the protective purpose of domestic-violence orders and risk discouraging victims from seeking or enforcing them.

## Conclusion

The court held that Indiana’s invasion-of-privacy statute does not permit prosecuting the protected person for aiding, inducing, or causing the restrained person to violate a no-contact order; responsibility for compliance and criminal liability rests with the restrained person, so the charges against Patterson were ordered dismissed.


Patterson v. State, 979 N.E.2d 1066 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)