## Facts

- Richard Paul Pears, age 19, spent an evening drinking in Fairbanks and repeatedly drove between bars while intoxicated.
- Pears drove at high speed and repeatedly ran stop signs and red lights, frightening a passenger who nevertheless continued riding with him.
- Two police officers stopped Pears, determined he was intoxicated, and explicitly told him not to drive; Pears waited until they left and then resumed driving.
- After dropping off his passenger, Pears continued driving; another motorist observed Pears speeding, running red lights, and using a right-turn lane to pass stopped cars before proceeding straight through intersections.
- At another intersection, Pears again used the right-turn lane to pass stopped vehicles and entered against a red light without braking, colliding with a crossing vehicle.
- The collision killed two occupants and severely injured a third.
- At trial, the State argued Pears’ course of driving and disregard of explicit warnings showed “extreme indifference to the value of human life”; Pears asserted he had “passed out” at the moment of impact.

## Issues

1. Whether Alaska law permits prosecuting drunk-driving fatalities as second-degree murder under the general homicide statute, or whether the legislature intended such cases to be limited to lesser traffic-related homicide offenses.
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the mens rea for second-degree murder based on “extreme indifference to the value of human life,” despite Pears’ claim of unconsciousness at impact.
3. Whether a 20-year concurrent sentence for the murder convictions (plus permanent driver’s license revocation) was excessive.

## Decision

- The Alaska Court of Appeals affirmed Pears’ convictions for two counts of second-degree murder and one count of second-degree assault.
- The court held that vehicular homicides caused by drunk driving may be charged as second-degree murder when the State proves the statutory mental state; traffic-homicide statutes did not preclude a murder charge.
- The court found sufficient evidence that Pears acted with extreme indifference to human life, emphasizing his extended pattern of dangerous driving and his decision to drive after explicit police warnings.
- The court rejected Pears’ argument that a claimed blackout at the instant of impact negated the requisite mental state, concluding the jury could base culpability on his earlier conscious decisions and conduct.
- The court affirmed the sentence, concluding it was not clearly mistaken even though it exceeded prior Alaska sentences in intoxicated-driving fatality cases.

## Legal Principles

- Alaska’s second-degree murder statute applies to deaths caused by a motor vehicle when the defendant’s conduct manifests “extreme indifference to the value of human life.”
- Specific traffic-related homicide offenses (e.g., negligent homicide or manslaughter) may overlap with, and do not categorically displace, prosecution under general murder provisions when the heightened mens rea is supported by the evidence.
- “Extreme indifference” may be shown by a sustained course of highly dangerous conduct, particularly where the defendant is aware of intoxication, receives explicit warnings, and consciously disregards obvious risks.
- A defendant’s claim of unconsciousness at the moment of impact does not necessarily defeat proof of extreme indifference when the jury can find the culpable mental state from the defendant’s earlier voluntary decisions and reckless driving behavior.
- On appellate review of sentencing, a severe sentence may be upheld as not clearly mistaken where the offense involves extraordinary dangerousness and multiple victims, even if higher than sentences in comparable cases.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed that exceptionally dangerous drunk driving can constitute second-degree murder in Alaska when it demonstrates extreme indifference to human life, and it upheld Pears’ murder convictions and 20-year concurrent sentence based on his prolonged, warned-against, and lethal course of reckless driving.


Pears v. State, 672 P.2d 903 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983)