## Facts

- During the marriage, Dan’s parents conveyed four mineral-interest deeds to Dan; the spouses jointly leased the minerals to third parties.
- A 1981 divorce decree stated that “the estate of the parties” was divided into two property schedules (one for each spouse).
- The decree did not specifically list the four mineral interests, but each schedule included a residuary clause awarding that spouse a “one-half interest in all other property or assets not otherwise disposed of or divided herein.”
- Dan was served in the divorce case but did not appear, retain counsel, or pursue appellate or collateral relief from the decree for many years.
- After the divorce, both spouses received royalty payments; Dan claimed he did not learn Rita received royalties until 2002.
- In 2006, Dan sought (1) clarification in the divorce cause regarding the minerals and (2) a declaratory judgment that the mineral deeds were his separate property.
- The trial court consolidated the matters, found the minerals were Dan’s separate property by gift, and concluded the divorce decree did not partition the minerals; it awarded Dan the mineral interests and royalties.
- Rita asserted a counterclaim for unpaid child support and attorney’s fees; Dan filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on the statutory time limit.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court impermissibly reclassified and redistributed property already divided in the 1981 divorce decree by awarding Dan 100% of the mineral interests.
2. Whether the requested post-decree relief was a permissible clarification of an ambiguous decree or an impermissible substantive modification of the property division.
3. Whether the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Rita’s child-support arrearage claim because it was brought outside the statutory enforcement period.

## Decision

- The Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment upholding Dan’s award of the mineral interests and rendered judgment for Rita on that issue.
- The Court held the 1981 decree’s residuary clauses divided the mineral interests by granting each spouse a one-half interest in property not otherwise listed.
- The trial court’s later judgment awarding Dan 100% of the minerals constituted a substantive change to the decree, not a permissible clarification.
- The Court upheld dismissal of Rita’s child-support claim for lack of jurisdiction because it was filed outside the statutory limitations period.

## Legal Principles

- A final divorce decree dividing the parties’ estate is res judicata as to that property division and cannot be substantively altered after it becomes final absent authorized post-judgment relief.
- A clarification order may address ambiguity in implementing a decree but may not change the substantive division of property.
- Broad residuary clauses dividing “all other property” generally operate to partition property existing at the time of divorce even if the decree does not specifically list the asset.
- Statutory limits on actions to enforce child-support arrears can be jurisdictional; claims filed outside the enforcement window must be dismissed.

## Conclusion

The court treated the 1981 decree’s residuary language as a complete division of the parties’ property, including unlisted mineral interests, and held that decades-later “clarification” could not strip one spouse of an awarded one-half interest; however, the ex-wife’s child-support arrearage claim was barred by the statutory enforcement period.


Pearson v. Fillingim, 332 S.W.3d 361 (Tex. 2011)