## Facts

- The Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) filed a petition seeking a common-law writ of habeas corpus under CPLR article 70 on behalf of Tommy, a chimpanzee kept on respondents’ property in Gloversville, New York.
- NhRP alleged Tommy was unlawfully detained and requested his transfer to a primate sanctuary.
- NhRP submitted expert affidavits asserting chimpanzees possess complex cognitive abilities, including autonomy and self-awareness, comparable in certain respects to humans.
- NhRP did not allege respondents violated any animal welfare or wild-animal possession statutes, and did not ask the court to evaluate Tommy’s living conditions.
- The petition expressly sought to expand the common-law meaning of “person” to include a chimpanzee for purposes of habeas corpus.

## Issues

1. Whether a chimpanzee is a “person” entitled to seek habeas corpus relief under CPLR article 70.

## Decision

- The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the trial court’s denial of NhRP’s application for an order to show cause commencing a CPLR article 70 habeas proceeding.
- The court held that a chimpanzee is not a “person” entitled to the rights and protections of the writ of habeas corpus.
- The court declined to enlarge the common-law definition of “person” to afford habeas rights to a nonhuman animal.

## Legal Principles

- Habeas corpus under CPLR article 70 is a summary procedure allowing a “person” who is illegally imprisoned or restrained in liberty to challenge the legality of the detention.
- In New York’s common-law tradition, the writ has been used to protect human liberty interests; historical practice informs the scope of “person” in this context.
- The court treated legal personhood, for habeas purposes, as linked to the capacity to bear societal obligations and legal duties; a being that cannot bear legal duties is not a “person” within the meaning of the habeas framework.
- Cognitive complexity and asserted human-like mental capacities, standing alone, do not determine legal personhood for purposes of habeas corpus.
- Broad changes to the legal status of animals were viewed as matters for the Legislature, particularly where statutory schemes already regulate animal welfare and possession.

## Conclusion

The court refused to recognize a chimpanzee as a legal “person” under CPLR article 70 and therefore denied habeas corpus relief sought on Tommy’s behalf, leaving any expansion of animal legal status to legislative action rather than judicial redefinition of common-law personhood.


People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 124 A.D.3d 148, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2014)