## Facts

- Police officers in Santa Ana observed Vincent William Acosta seated in a stolen Nissan Pulsar and approached to investigate.
- Acosta accelerated and fled, leading officers on a high-speed pursuit of roughly 48 miles through Orange County.
- During the chase, Acosta repeatedly ran stop signs and red lights, drove into opposing lanes, used shoulders to bypass traffic, and weaved through vehicles at high speeds.
- Several law-enforcement agencies joined the pursuit, including multiple police helicopters tracking the flight from above.
- Two helicopters (Costa Mesa and Newport Beach) converged in the same airspace and collided midair, killing three occupants of the Costa Mesa helicopter.
- Trial evidence included expert testimony indicating the Costa Mesa pilot violated certain aviation regulations and that such midair collisions were extremely rare in pursuit operations.
- Acosta was convicted of three counts of second-degree murder (for the helicopter deaths) and unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle without the owner’s consent.

## Issues

1. Whether Acosta’s conduct in initiating and maintaining a dangerous high-speed chase was a proximate cause of the deaths, or whether the helicopter collision and pilot negligence were unforeseeable superseding causes.
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove implied malice—i.e., a conscious disregard for human life—supporting second-degree murder liability for the helicopter deaths.

## Decision

- The court held the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find Acosta’s conduct was a proximate cause of the helicopter deaths.
- The court ruled the helicopter collision and intervening pilot negligence were not so highly extraordinary or unforeseeable as to break the causal chain.
- The court reversed Acosta’s three second-degree murder convictions for insufficient evidence of implied malice.
- The vehicle-theft-related conviction was left undisturbed.

## Legal Principles

- Criminal proximate cause may be satisfied where the defendant’s conduct is a substantial factor in producing death and the result is not so highly unusual or extraordinary, in retrospect, as to fall outside the scope of the risk created.
- Negligent or mistaken acts by third parties, including law enforcement responding to a defendant’s conduct, generally do not constitute superseding causes unless their actions are so aberrant that the resulting harm is highly extraordinary.
- Implied malice for second-degree murder requires more than dangerous conduct and causation; it requires proof the defendant knowingly engaged in life-endangering conduct and acted with conscious disregard for human life as to the relevant risk.
- A defendant may be a legal cause of death without having the mental state required for murder; causation and mens rea are separate requirements.

## Conclusion

The court sustained a broad view of criminal proximate cause by treating negligent police aviation responses to a dangerous pursuit as foreseeable, yet limited murder liability by requiring specific proof of implied malice beyond mere causation, reversing the second-degree murder convictions while leaving the vehicle offense intact.


People v. Acosta, 232 Cal. App. 3d 1375, 284 Cal. Rptr. 117 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)