## Facts

- Marlon Arnold was tried for assault arising from the stabbing of his former girlfriend; he asserted self-defense.
- During voir dire, a prospective juror (Juror No. 4) stated she had a sociology degree, a women’s studies minor, and had done extensive research on domestic violence and battered women’s syndrome.
- Juror No. 4 stated, “I have a problem with that,” and agreed it might be an issue if she became an “expert” in deliberations, effectively an “unsworn witness.”
- When asked if she would be more comfortable on a different type of case (e.g., bank robbery), she said she would.
- Later, the panel was asked generally whether they could follow the law and not treat the case as a referendum on domestic violence; the record reflected only a collective “yes” without identifying individual jurors.
- The defense challenged Juror No. 4 for cause; the trial court denied the challenge.
- The defense removed Juror No. 4 by peremptory challenge and ultimately exhausted all peremptory challenges.
- Arnold was convicted; the Appellate Division reversed; the prosecution appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court erred by denying a for-cause challenge to a prospective juror who expressed doubts about impartiality and potential reliance on specialized knowledge, where the record lacked an unequivocal assurance of fairness.
2. Whether reversal is required when the defendant uses a peremptory challenge to remove the juror and later exhausts all peremptory challenges.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order reversing the conviction and remanding for a new trial.
- The court held the trial court should have excused Juror No. 4 for cause because her answers raised substantial doubt about impartiality.
- The record contained no individualized, unequivocal assurance from Juror No. 4 that she could be fair and decide solely on the evidence.
- Because the defendant was compelled to use a peremptory challenge to remove the juror and then exhausted peremptories, the error required reversal.

## Legal Principles

- A defendant is entitled to an impartial jury; jurors must decide the case solely on the evidence admitted in court.
- When a prospective juror expresses doubts about impartiality, the juror must provide an unequivocal assurance of fairness before a for-cause challenge may be denied.
- A general, panel-wide affirmation that jurors can follow the law does not substitute for an individualized, unequivocal assurance from the particular juror whose impartiality is in question.
- A juror’s potential to introduce specialized knowledge in deliberations as an “unsworn witness” supports a finding of substantial doubt about impartiality.
- If a for-cause challenge is erroneously denied and the defendant uses a peremptory strike to remove the juror and later exhausts peremptory challenges, reversal is required without a separate showing of actual bias on the seated jury.

## Conclusion

The court ordered a new trial because the prospective juror’s statements created substantial doubt about impartiality, and the trial court failed to secure a clear, individualized assurance of fairness before denying the defendant’s challenge for cause, forcing the defendant to expend and ultimately exhaust peremptory challenges.


People v. Arnold, 96 N.Y.2d 358 (N.Y. 2001)