## Facts

- Victor Casassa and Victoria Lo Consolo lived in the same apartment complex and dated casually in 1976.
- After Lo Consolo told Casassa she was not “falling in love” with him, Casassa became obsessed and engaged in repeated, covert entries to eavesdrop and observe her.
- Casassa broke into Lo Consolo’s apartment while she was away, lay in her bed, and carried a knife anticipating he would harm her or kill himself.
- On February 28, 1977, Casassa went to Lo Consolo’s apartment with alcohol as a gift; she rejected him.
- Casassa produced a steak knife, stabbed Lo Consolo multiple times in the throat, dragged her to the bathroom, and submerged her in a filled bathtub to ensure death.
- During the police investigation the next day, Casassa approached officers and stated he had been in the victim’s apartment the night of the killing.

## Issues

1. Whether Casassa proved the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance (EED) to reduce second-degree murder to first-degree manslaughter.
2. Whether the statutory requirement of a “reasonable explanation or excuse” for EED is evaluated by a subjective standard, an objective standard, or a mixed standard keyed to a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be.

## Decision

- The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction for second-degree murder.
- The court held the EED defense contains both a subjective component (actual extreme emotional disturbance) and an objective qualifying component (a reasonable explanation or excuse).
- Although evidence could support that Casassa was emotionally disturbed, the fact finder permissibly concluded the disturbance lacked a reasonable explanation or excuse when measured against a reasonable person in Casassa’s situation.
- The trial court therefore properly rejected EED mitigation and sustained liability for murder rather than manslaughter.

## Legal Principles

- New York’s EED affirmative defense to second-degree murder requires a two-part showing: (1) the defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the homicide, and (2) there was a reasonable explanation or excuse for that disturbance.
- “Reasonable explanation or excuse” is assessed under a mixed standard: from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be.
- The “defendant’s situation” may include relevant circumstances and characteristics, but the standard does not become purely personal; reactions that are entirely idiosyncratic cannot satisfy reasonableness.
- EED is broader than common-law heat of passion because it can include a broader range of stressors and does not require an immediate provoking act, but it is not a substitute for insanity or general mental-defect doctrines.
- Even where extreme emotional disturbance is shown, mitigation is not automatic; the fact finder must still determine that the statutory reasonableness requirement is met.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed Casassa’s second-degree murder conviction, holding that EED mitigation requires both proof of actual extreme emotional disturbance and proof that the disturbance had a reasonable explanation or excuse measured against a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation, a requirement not met where the defendant’s reaction is chiefly idiosyncratic.


People v. Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d 668 (N.Y. 1980)