## Facts

- A Planned Parenthood clinic obtained a 1991 civil injunction against specified anti-abortion protesters and related persons, based on prior obstruction and harassment at the clinic.
- The injunction restricted certain conduct and required covered protesters to confine picketing and counseling to the sidewalk across the street from the clinic.
- In June and July 1994, several protesters (appellants) picketed on the clinic side of the street, in the area the injunction barred for covered persons.
- Appellants were not named in the injunction; when clinic staff attempted to provide copies, appellants refused and said it did not apply to them.
- The prosecution asserted appellants were bound by the injunction because they acted “in concert” with enjoined parties; an enjoined person (Norman Reece) drove by during at least one protest, and an appellant (Ross) motioned him to continue driving.
- The record lacked evidence that appellants were members or agents of the enjoined organization, personally knew enjoined individuals, coordinated with them, or participated in the conduct that led to the injunction.
- After a bench trial, appellants were convicted of misdemeanor contempt for disobeying a lawful court order under Penal Code § 166(a)(4).

## Issues

1. What standard governs when a nonparty to an injunction may be convicted of criminal contempt as a person acting “in concert” with an enjoined party?
2. Under that standard, was the evidence sufficient to prove appellants acted in concert with enjoined parties and were therefore bound by the injunction?

## Decision

- The Court of Appeal reversed the contempt convictions.
- The trial court used an overly broad standard that effectively treated notice plus similar protest conduct as sufficient to bind nonparties.
- Properly construed, “in concert” requires proof of coordinated or cooperative activity (or a qualifying relationship such as agency, membership, or privity) with an enjoined party, in addition to notice.
- The evidence showed, at most, independent protesters with notice of the injunction engaging in similar conduct; the episode of motioning an enjoined individual away did not show joint participation and instead suggested non-cooperation.

## Legal Principles

- Injunctions ordinarily bind only the parties and those in privity with them; nonparties may be bound only if they have notice and are agents, members, or act in active concert or participation with an enjoined party.
- For criminal contempt based on violating an injunction, the state must prove more than parallel conduct or shared beliefs; it must prove a concrete linkage to the enjoined party amounting to assistance, coordination, or cooperative action in violating the order.
- Because criminal contempt is quasi-criminal, injunctions and the class of persons bound are construed strictly; ambiguity about whether a nonparty is covered is resolved in favor of the accused.
- Notice of an injunction, without proof of privity/agency or active concert with an enjoined party, is insufficient to extend the injunction’s prohibitions to strangers to the original proceeding.

## Conclusion

The court set aside misdemeanor contempt convictions because the prosecution failed to prove that nonparty protesters, though aware of an existing injunction, acted in active concert with any enjoined party; independent, similar protest activity cannot alone make a nonparty bound by an injunction for criminal contempt purposes.


People v. Conrad, 55 Cal. App. 4th 896, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 248 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)