## Facts

- Gilbert Lee Durham and Edgar Leonard Robinson traveled to California after committing a series of armed robberies and stole a vehicle, using out-of-state plates.
- Around 4:00 a.m., Los Angeles police officers stopped the vehicle after observing erratic driving.
- Durham, the driver, exited and approached the patrol car; Robinson remained in the passenger seat.
- Officers asked Durham for identification and asked about the passenger; an officer then directed Robinson to the rear of the car and told him to raise his hands.
- Robinson drew a pistol and shot Officer Du Puis, who later died from the wound.
- Durham did not shoot or physically attack the officers.
- A jury convicted both defendants of first-degree murder; Durham received life imprisonment and Robinson received death.

## Issues

1. Whether Durham, as an aider and abettor in the underlying criminal venture, could be convicted of first-degree murder for Robinson’s killing of a police officer despite not firing the fatal shot.
2. Whether the killing was a natural and probable (reasonably foreseeable) consequence of the jointly undertaken felonies.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of California affirmed both first-degree murder convictions and affirmed the sentences.
- The court rejected Durham’s claim that he could not be held liable because Robinson alone shot the officer.
- The court held that the homicide was a natural and probable consequence of the felonious venture in which Durham knowingly participated, making Durham chargeable as a principal.

## Legal Principles

- An aider and abettor is criminally liable not only for the offense he or she intended to facilitate, but also for any additional offense committed by the confederate that is a natural and probable consequence of the aided offense.
- Aiding-and-abetting liability does not require the accomplice to personally perform the act constituting the homicide if the killing was a reasonably foreseeable outgrowth of the common criminal plan.
- Foreseeability may be supported by the nature of the enterprise (e.g., dangerous felonies involving weapons, flight, or confrontation with police) and the participant’s knowledge of a confederate’s violent propensities.
- First-degree murder liability may attach to an accomplice under aiding-and-abetting principles when the resulting homicide falls within the natural and probable consequences of the underlying felonious conduct.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed Durham’s first-degree murder conviction, holding that an accomplice in a dangerous criminal enterprise may be convicted of murder when a co-felon’s killing of a police officer is a reasonably foreseeable, natural and probable consequence of the venture, even if the accomplice did not personally shoot the victim.


People v. Durham, 449 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1969)