## Facts

- Earl Wayne Garner was charged with vehicular homicide, DUI, and driving with excessive blood alcohol content after a fatal collision in Colorado Springs.
- Garner drove a pickup truck on a four-lane divided residential street where several children stood on the median preparing to cross.
- All children stopped except twelve-year-old Lisa Uhrenic, who continued into the roadway; Garner swerved from the left lane into the right lane, but the truck struck and killed her.
- At the preliminary hearing on vehicular homicide, the defense stipulated that Garner was intoxicated, he was driving the truck that hit the child, and the child died from the accident.
- Evidence showed Garner’s blood-alcohol level was 0.201 about one hour after the collision.
- An investigating officer estimated Garner’s speed at about 43.39 mph in a 35 mph zone and testified the collision would still have occurred at the posted speed, though he could not say whether death would have resulted.
- Another officer opined the child’s running into traffic, not Garner’s conduct, was the “proximate cause” of the accident.
- The trial court dismissed the vehicular-homicide count for lack of probable cause, reasoning that speeding, rather than intoxication, was the proximate cause of death.
- The prosecution appealed the dismissal.

## Issues

1. At a preliminary hearing on vehicular homicide under Colorado’s strict-liability statute, must the prosecution show that intoxication (as distinct from other driving conduct) proximately caused the death, or is it enough to show intoxicated driving that resulted in death and could be a proximate cause?

## Decision

- The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and reinstated the vehicular-homicide charge.
- The court held the trial court improperly resolved disputed causation questions and weighed competing evidence at the preliminary-hearing stage.
- The court ruled that the statute’s “proximate cause” element concerns the defendant’s conduct of operating a vehicle while intoxicated; the prosecution need not isolate intoxication as the exclusive causal factor.
- The record contained sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that Garner’s intoxicated driving was a proximate cause of the child’s death, even if other factors also contributed.

## Legal Principles

- Under Colorado’s vehicular-homicide statute for driving under the influence, the relevant “conduct” is operating or driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated, and that conduct must be a proximate cause of death.
- Because the offense is designated strict liability, the prosecution need not prove a culpable mental state; it must prove a voluntary act of intoxicated driving and proximate causation.
- Proximate cause commonly presents a fact question for the fact finder; at a preliminary hearing the court determines only whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief the defendant committed the charged offense.
- More than one factor may be a proximate cause; contributory actions by a victim or other driving-related factors do not necessarily sever causation as a matter of law at the probable-cause stage.

## Conclusion

The Colorado Supreme Court reinstated the vehicular-homicide charge, holding that probable cause was shown where the defendant voluntarily drove while intoxicated and a death resulted under circumstances permitting a finding that intoxicated driving was a proximate cause, even though other contributing causes were suggested.


People v. Garner, 781 P.2d 87 (Colo. 1989)