## Facts

- Hale was charged with third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC III) based on sexual intercourse with a complainant who said she did not consent.
- At trial, consent was the central dispute: the prosecution claimed the intercourse was nonconsensual, while Hale claimed the complainant consented (or that he believed she consented).
- The trial judge instructed the jury using a standard consent formulation, telling jurors that: “If the evidence does not convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that the sexual acts complained of were not consented to, then [Hale] is not guilty of the crime.”
- Hale did not request an additional jury instruction stating that a “reasonable and bona fide belief” in the complainant’s consent would bar conviction.
- After the jury convicted Hale, he appealed, arguing the instructions improperly focused on the complainant’s subjective lack of consent and failed to address whether Hale reasonably believed she consented.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court committed error by failing, on its own initiative, to instruct the jury that a defendant’s reasonable and bona fide belief in the complainant’s consent precludes conviction for CSC III.
2. Whether Hale preserved any claim of instructional error by requesting the “reasonable and bona fide belief” instruction at trial, and if not, whether the omission required reversal to prevent manifest injustice.

## Decision

- The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Hale’s conviction.
- The court held the trial judge was not required to give a “reasonable and bona fide belief in consent” instruction sua sponte.
- The court found the claim was not preserved because trial counsel did not request the specific instruction Hale sought on appeal.
- The court concluded the consent instruction given—requiring acquittal unless the jury was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the acts were not consented to—adequately stated the prosecution’s burden and did not warrant reversal.

## Legal Principles

- In CSC III prosecutions based on nonconsensual sexual penetration, the prosecution must prove lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.
- A standard instruction directing acquittal unless the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the sexual acts were not consented to properly places the burden of proof on the prosecution.
- A trial court is not required, without a defense request, to add a separate instruction that a defendant’s reasonable and bona fide belief in consent bars conviction.
- Failure to request a specific jury instruction generally leaves the issue unpreserved for appeal; absent manifest injustice, an appellate court will not reverse for an unrequested instruction.

## Conclusion

People v. Hale upheld a CSC III conviction where the jury was instructed that it must acquit unless it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court had no duty to add, on its own, an instruction framing “reasonable and bona fide belief in consent” as a separate bar to conviction, especially because the defense did not request that instruction and the charge given correctly required the prosecution to prove nonconsent beyond a reasonable doubt.


People v. Hale, 370 N.W.2d 382 (1985)