## Facts

- Robert Heitzman, a 67-year-old dependent adult unable to care for himself, lived with two adult sons who subjected him to severe neglect and abusive living conditions.
- Susan Valerie Heitzman, Robert’s adult daughter, previously lived with and cared for him but later moved out; she continued to visit and knew of the neglect by her brothers.
- After Robert’s death, the sons were prosecuted for direct elder abuse; Susan was charged under Penal Code § 368(a) based on the statute’s “willfully … permits” language, alleging she failed to intervene despite knowledge of the abuse.
- Susan was not alleged to have directly abused her father, nor to have had his care or custody at the relevant time; the theory of liability was omission after awareness.

## Issues

1. Whether Penal Code § 368(a), read to impose felony liability on any person who knows of elder abuse and fails to stop it, is unconstitutionally vague absent a limiting construction.
2. If § 368(a) is construed narrowly to avoid vagueness, whether a non-custodial adult child who knows of abuse “permits” that abuse within the meaning of the statute.

## Decision

- The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and reinstated the dismissal of the charge against Susan.
- The court held that § 368(a) would be unconstitutionally vague if interpreted to criminalize any person’s failure to prevent known elder abuse.
- To preserve the statute, the court adopted a limiting construction: “permits” liability applies only to a person who, under existing tort principles, has a duty to control the conduct of the person directly abusing the elder or dependent adult.
- Under that construction, the record did not show Susan had a tort-based “special relationship” with her brothers that created a duty to control their conduct; therefore, she was improperly charged under § 368(a).

## Legal Principles

- Due process requires criminal statutes to provide fair notice of prohibited conduct and standards sufficient to prevent arbitrary enforcement; otherwise they are void for vagueness.
- Penal Code § 368(a)’s “willfully … permits” clause cannot be read to create a general criminal duty to intervene whenever a person knows of elder abuse.
- “Permitting” elder abuse under § 368(a) requires a preexisting legal duty to act, satisfied (for this clause) only when tort law recognizes a duty to control the abuser based on a qualifying “special relationship.”
- The adult child–parent relationship, without care or custody and without a tort-based duty to control the direct abuser, is insufficient to impose § 368(a) omission liability.

## Conclusion

The court upheld Penal Code § 368(a) only by limiting “permits” liability to defendants who have a tort-recognized duty to control the abuser, and it held that a non-custodial adult child with knowledge of abuse lacks criminal liability under the statute absent such a duty.


People v. Heitzman, 9 Cal. 4th 189, 886 P.2d 1229 (Cal. 1994)