## Facts

- On June 15, 1990, 22-year-old Mercy P. visited the home of a long-time family friend, Sandra S., on the eve of Mercy’s wedding.
- Mercy met Hector Guillermo Iniguez, Sandra’s fiancé, for the first time that evening; he appeared intoxicated, and the group drank wine with dinner.
- Around 11:30 p.m., Mercy went to sleep in the living room, clothed, lying on top of a sleeping bag.
- Between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m., Mercy awoke to movement behind her and saw Iniguez naked and approaching from behind.
- Without speaking, Iniguez pulled down Mercy’s pants, fondled her buttocks, and penetrated her while she lay on her stomach.
- Mercy (about 105 pounds) did not physically resist or cry out; she testified she was very scared, felt frozen with fear, and believed resistance could lead to immediate harm given Iniguez’s size (about 205 pounds) and the circumstances.
- After the intercourse, Iniguez left the room; Mercy promptly dressed, left the home, went to a friend, sought medical care, and reported the incident.
- Medical evidence was consistent with intercourse involving Iniguez.
- At trial, Iniguez admitted the sexual acts and admitted Mercy did not consent; his defense was that the prosecution failed to prove force or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury.

## Issues

1. Whether substantial evidence supported rape under California Penal Code § 261(a)(2) when lack of consent was undisputed but the victim did not physically resist and the defendant made no express threats or separate overt violence beyond the penetration.
2. What relationship exists between proof of “fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury” and the statutory requirement that intercourse be “accomplished against a person’s will” under § 261(a)(2).

## Decision

- The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal.
- The Court held substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that intercourse was accomplished by fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury under § 261(a)(2).
- The Court reinstated the jury’s rape conviction.

## Legal Principles

- Penal Code § 261(a)(2) does not require a victim to physically resist to establish rape by force or fear; the question is whether the act was against the victim’s will and accomplished by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury.
- “Fear” under § 261(a)(2) requires evidence the victim actually experienced fear and that the fear was reasonable under the circumstances.
- Fear need not be proven by express threats, physical injury, or additional violence; it may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances, including relative size disparity, isolation, surprise, and vulnerability.
- A victim’s lack of resistance, failure to cry out, or apparent passivity may be consistent with fear (including a freezing response) and does not, by itself, negate the element of fear.
- On appellate review, the question is whether a rational trier of fact could find the element of fear beyond a reasonable doubt based on the totality of the evidence.

## Conclusion

The court held that rape by fear under Penal Code § 261(a)(2) can be established without proof of physical resistance or explicit threats when the circumstances reasonably support the victim’s testimony that she froze and submitted out of fear of immediate bodily harm, and it reinstated the jury’s rape conviction on that basis.


People v. Iniguez, 7 Cal. 4th 847 (Cal. 1994)