## Facts

- A clerk employed by J.W. Goddard & Son stole cloth intending to sell it to Samuel Jaffe at about half its value.
- Before the planned delivery, the theft was discovered and the cloth was recovered and restored to the owner.
- Acting with the owner’s authority, the clerk then offered the recovered cloth to Jaffe as part of a sting.
- Jaffe bought the cloth believing it was stolen and paid a price consistent with that belief.
- At the time of the transaction, the cloth was under the owner’s control and no longer had the legal status of “stolen property.”

## Issues

1. Whether a defendant may be convicted of attempting to receive stolen property knowing it to be stolen when the property is not, in fact and law, stolen at the time of receipt.
2. Whether a mistaken belief that goods are stolen can satisfy a statute requiring knowledge that the goods were stolen.

## Decision

- The New York Court of Appeals reversed the judgment affirming Jaffe’s conviction for attempt.
- Because the goods had been recovered and were no longer stolen property, an essential element of the completed offense under Penal Code § 550 was absent.
- The court held that Jaffe could not “know” the goods were stolen when they were not stolen in fact; his belief was insufficient.
- The court treated the case as one of legal impossibility: even if Jaffe acted exactly as intended, the completed act would not have constituted the charged crime.

## Legal Principles

- An attempt requires conduct that, if completed under the actual circumstances, would constitute a crime; if the completed act would not be criminal, attempt liability does not lie (legal impossibility).
- For receiving stolen property, the prosecution must prove (1) receipt or purchase, (2) knowledge the property was stolen, and (3) that the property was in fact stolen at the time of receipt.
- A defendant’s erroneous belief about a required external condition (here, that goods are stolen) does not substitute for statutory “knowledge” when the condition does not exist.
- Legal impossibility is distinct from factual impossibility; factual impossibility may still support attempt when the completed act would be criminal if circumstances were as the actor supposed.

## Conclusion

The court set aside the attempt conviction because the cloth had been recovered and therefore was not stolen property when delivered in the sting, making it legally impossible for Jaffe to commit (or attempt) the statutory offense requiring receipt of stolen goods with knowledge of their stolen status.


People v. Jaffe, 185 N.Y. 497 (N.Y. 1906)