## Facts

- Audrey James was charged by information with prostitution under N.Y. Penal Law § 230.00 (a class B misdemeanor).
- James was 21 years old, had no prior prostitution charge, and was attending the American Business Institute majoring in business administration.
- Laverne McCray was separately charged by information with prostitution under the same statute, and her motion was decided with James’s because the facts and legal questions were materially similar.
- McCray was 23 years old, had no prior prostitution charge, was attending business school, and lived with her parents.
- Before a 1978 statutory amendment, New York law punished the prostitute more severely than the patron: prostitution was a class B misdemeanor, while patronizing a prostitute was treated as a violation.
- During that earlier period, the District Attorney maintained a generally strict anti–plea bargaining approach for prostitution-related cases but made a regular exception for first-offender prostitutes by offering an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD).
- After the Legislature amended the law to treat patrons and prostitutes equally by making the patron offense a class B misdemeanor as well, the District Attorney ended the practice of offering ACDs to first-offender prostitutes, in the name of equal treatment and enforcement.
- With no ACD being offered, James and McCray moved to dismiss in the interests of justice under CPL §§ 170.30 and 170.40, arguing that continued prosecution would be unjust given their personal circumstances and the practical consequences of the policy change.
- The People opposed the motions, arguing that defendants were attempting to use CPL § 170.40 to override prosecutorial judgment about charging, plea bargaining, and when (or whether) to consent to an ACD.

## Issues

1. Whether the court should dismiss first-offender prostitution informations in the interests of justice under CPL § 170.40 based on compelling circumstances showing that prosecution or conviction would result in injustice.
2. Whether granting an interest-of-justice dismissal improperly interferes with the District Attorney’s discretion to set plea and ACD policies after the statutory equalization of penalties for patrons and prostitutes.

## Decision

- The court granted both motions and dismissed the informations in the interests of justice under CPL § 170.40.
- The court held that CPL § 170.40 confers an independent judicial power to dismiss when compelling factors show that prosecution or conviction would result in injustice, even if the accusatory instruments are legally sufficient.
- The court rejected the argument that dismissal would impermissibly substitute judicial judgment for prosecutorial policy on ACDs, explaining that the Legislature assigned the “interests of justice” determination to the court.
- The court found that the District Attorney’s post-amendment “no ACD” approach, though framed as equal treatment, could operate in a markedly harsher way against first-offender prostitutes because of the real-world burdens of fines, prosecution, and criminal records.
- The court relied on the defendants’ youth, first-offender status, educational efforts, and prospects for lawful employment, and concluded that continued prosecution would create consequences out of proportion to the circumstances presented.

## Legal Principles

- CPL § 170.40 authorizes dismissal “in the interest of justice” when a compelling factor, consideration, or circumstance clearly shows that prosecution or conviction would result in injustice.
- An interest-of-justice dismissal is a discretionary judicial remedy separate from rulings on factual guilt, legal sufficiency, or constitutional error.
- In exercising CPL § 170.40 discretion, a court may weigh the defendant’s background and character, the circumstances of the offense, the purposes served by prosecution and punishment, and the practical effects of continuing the case.
- A prosecutor’s general policy regarding pleas or ACDs does not eliminate the court’s statutory authority to dismiss in the interests of justice on a case-by-case record.
- Formal equality in statutory grading of offenses does not require a court to ignore unequal practical consequences when deciding whether continued prosecution would be unjust.

## Conclusion

In *People v. James*, the Criminal Court of the City of New York dismissed first-offender prostitution charges under CPL § 170.40, reasoning that the court’s interest-of-justice authority is independent of the District Attorney’s no-ACD policy adopted after the 1978 equalization of penalties and that, given the defendants’ youth, lack of prior offenses, educational commitments, and the disproportionate real-world burdens of prosecution, continuing the cases would result in injustice.


People v. James, 415 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1979)