## Facts

- Carolyn Lamoreaux met Gustave Eric Jansson on January 7, 1979, in Grand Rapids after being introduced by a mutual friend.
- Jansson discussed a purported full-time secretarial position and drove Lamoreaux to his workplace, the Stedman Agency, to describe the job and show her the building.
- In an office, Jansson made a sexual remark; Lamoreaux testified she rejected it and said she would not “do things like that.”
- Lamoreaux testified Jansson turned off the light, grabbed her as she stood, pulled her to the floor, removed her clothing, and had sexual intercourse with her after removing his own clothing.
- Lamoreaux testified she did not consent, felt frightened and panicked, and did not know what action to take.
- After intercourse, Jansson telephoned his employer, John/Frank Stedman, who came to the building; Lamoreaux testified Jansson exposed her breasts when Stedman arrived.
- Jansson drove Lamoreaux back to the meeting location; she complied with his request for her phone number and later sought a ride.
- Lamoreaux promptly told a police officer acquaintance and then went to the police station in the early morning hours of January 8, 1979, to report a rape.
- Laboratory evidence indicated seminal fluid in cervical smears; Stedman provided testimony about what he observed that night.
- The defense theory was consent, emphasizing limited physical resistance and post-incident behavior as inconsistent with nonconsent.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that sexual penetration occurred “by force or coercion” and without consent, as required for third-degree criminal sexual conduct under MCL 750.520d(1)(b).
2. Whether alleged evidentiary rulings, credibility-related complaints, or jury-instruction errors required reversal.

## Decision

- The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction for third-degree criminal sexual conduct and left the sentence undisturbed.
- The court held the complainant’s testimony, together with corroborating circumstances, permitted a rational jury to find force or coercion and lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The court rejected arguments that the absence of vigorous resistance or a contemporaneous verbal refusal rendered the evidence insufficient.
- The court found no reversible error in the trial court’s evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

## Legal Principles

- On sufficiency review, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find each element beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Under MCL 750.520d(1)(b), “force or coercion” may be shown by physical acts and circumstances that compel submission through fear; extreme violence is not required.
- Lack of consent may be established by credible testimony that the complainant was forced or submitted out of fear, even if physical resistance is limited.
- Appellate courts do not reweigh credibility; inconsistencies and competing inferences about consent are generally for the jury to resolve.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed a third-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction where the complainant testified she rejected a sexual advance and was physically overpowered and compelled by fear; the prosecution was not required to prove an explicit verbal “no” at every stage or extreme physical resistance, and credibility disputes remained for the jury.


People v. Jansson, 323 N.W.2d 508 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)