## Facts

- Phillip Jefferson and Clyde Edward Savage were separately charged with first-degree murder counts that included Colorado’s “extreme indifference” murder provision, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-102(1)(d) (1986), along with other counts.
- The trial courts dismissed the extreme-indifference counts as facially unconstitutional under the Colorado Constitution’s equal-protection guarantee, reasoning the offense could not be rationally distinguished from second-degree murder, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-103(1)(a) (1986), despite carrying a greater penalty.
- The dismissals relied on a prior decision that invalidated an earlier version of the extreme-indifference statute as indistinguishable from second-degree murder for equal-protection purposes.
- Jefferson also argued the amended extreme-indifference provision was void for vagueness.
- The prosecution appealed the constitutional rulings, and the cases were consolidated because they presented the same challenge to the statute.

## Issues

1. Whether Colorado’s amended extreme-indifference first-degree murder statute, § 18-3-102(1)(d), violates Colorado equal protection because it is not rationally distinguishable from second-degree murder, § 18-3-103(1)(a), while imposing a substantially greater punishment.
2. Whether § 18-3-102(1)(d) is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to provide fair notice of prohibited conduct and adequate enforcement standards.

## Decision

- The court reversed the trial courts’ facial invalidation of § 18-3-102(1)(d) and reinstated the dismissed extreme-indifference murder counts.
- The court held the amended statute is rationally distinguishable from second-degree murder and therefore does not violate Colorado equal protection.
- The court rejected the vagueness challenge, holding the amended language gives constitutionally sufficient notice and standards.
- The cases were remanded for further proceedings.

## Legal Principles

- A homicide statute with a greater penalty does not violate equal protection if its elements create a rational, meaningful distinction from a lesser homicide offense.
- Extreme-indifference first-degree murder may be treated as more serious than second-degree murder when it targets conduct evidencing “universal malice” and “extreme indifference to the value of human life generally,” reflected in indiscriminate, highly dangerous behavior creating a grave risk of death beyond a directed attack on a specific victim.
- A criminal statute is not void for vagueness if, read as a whole, it gives ordinary persons fair notice of the prohibited conduct and provides sufficient standards to limit arbitrary enforcement; terms describing grave risk and extreme indifference can be sufficiently definite in context.

## Conclusion

The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the amended extreme-indifference first-degree murder statute, finding it rationally more culpable than second-degree murder and sufficiently definite, and it reinstated the dismissed counts and remanded for continued prosecution.


People v. Jefferson, 748 P.2d 1223 (Colo. 1988)