People v. Kauffman, 152 Cal. 331, 92 P. 861 (Cal. 1907)

Facts

  • William Kauffman and five others jointly planned to burglarize and rob a safe at Cypress Lawn Cemetery using burglars’ tools and nitroglycerin.
  • Kauffman rented rooms where some of the group stayed; the group prepared for a nighttime trip to the cemetery and departed together.
  • Five conspirators carried revolvers; Kauffman did not, but carried a drill and a bottle of nitroglycerin he had made and had attempted to obtain a pistol before the trip.
  • To lessen detection risk, the group split into smaller squads while traveling to and from the cemetery.
  • At the cemetery they found an armed guard and abandoned the burglary plan, returning toward San Francisco.
  • During the return, the group again separated; a commotion occurred, two conspirators ran toward Kauffman’s group, and one fired a shot backward while fleeing.
  • Officer Eugene C. Robinson confronted the group, asked which man had the gun, and a conspirator shot Robinson during resistance to arrest; Robinson later died.
  • There was no evidence Kauffman fired a weapon or directly shot the officer; he argued the killing was outside any plan to commit burglary.

Issues

  1. Whether sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that the conspiracy included resisting arrest—potentially with deadly force—during the trip to and return from the planned burglary.
  2. Whether the killing of a police officer by a co-conspirator was a natural and probable consequence of the common design, or instead a fresh and independent act outside the conspiracy.
  3. What level of appellate review applies to a jury’s determination of the conspiracy’s scope and foreseeability of the homicide.

Decision

  • The California Supreme Court affirmed the order denying Kauffman’s motion for a new trial, leaving intact his second-degree murder conviction.
  • The court held there was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer the common plan included resisting arrest while going to and returning from the attempted safe burglary, even to the point of taking life.
  • The court concluded the homicide could be treated as a probable and natural consequence of that common design, making Kauffman criminally responsible despite not being the shooter and despite being unarmed.
  • When persons combine to commit an unlawful act, each is criminally responsible for confederates’ acts committed in furtherance of the common design.
  • Each conspirator is responsible for acts that follow incidentally from executing the common design as probable and natural consequences, even if not expressly intended as part of the original plan.
  • Liability does not extend to acts that are not contemplated, not in furtherance of the plan, and not the natural or legitimate consequence of anything connected to it; such “fresh and independent” acts impose responsibility only on the actor.
  • Whether a confederate’s act was the ordinary and probable effect of the common design, or a fresh and independent act outside it, is a question of fact for the jury; if any evidence supports the finding, it is conclusive on appeal.
  • Circumstantial evidence (arming for a serious felony, efforts to avoid detection, and group conduct during flight) can support an inference that the enterprise included resisting arrest and that a killing during armed resistance was foreseeable.

Conclusion

The court upheld Kauffman’s second-degree murder conviction on the ground that a jury could reasonably find the burglary conspiracy included resisting arrest during the venture and that a cohort’s fatal shooting of an officer during that resistance was a natural and probable consequence for which all conspirators were liable.